Why are Iran and Saudi Arabia rivals?

Hello, everyone! This weekend, I want to share my latest video with you all. I chronicle and analyze the complex and often adversarial relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Be sure to like my video, share my video, and sound off in the comments section!

How Africa could be Israel's next strategic partner

Israel's relations with sub-Saharan Africa are not often talked about in the news, but they have a deep practical and ideological basis. In his 1902 fiction work, Altneuland, Theodor Herzl (the father of political Zionism) wrote of "assisting in the redemption of the Africans." The father of pan-Africanism, Edward Wilmot Blyden, used Zionism as an ideological framework. Of course, there are the ties between the Jews and Africa that go back to antiquity, when the Queen of Sheba visited King Solomon. As the Europeans departed from Africa throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Israel established working relationships with the newly independent African states. The Israelis sent agricultural experts and exported agricultural technology to countries like Zambia. Israel's ties to Africa are even more important today, as Africa has experienced significant demographic and economic growth in recent years. There are lucrative and greatly beneficial opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa that Israel could capitalize on, thereby bolstering its security and economy. Allow me to propose policies that Jerusalem can pursue to forge deeper ties with Africa and use those ties to Israel's advantage.

Why does Africa matter to Israel?

Africa matters to Israel for the same reasons it matters to every other major player on the continent: its strategic location, mineral wealth, and untapped markets for goods and services. Compared to the US, China, and even the UAE, Israel's presence in Africa is minimal. I will give you some figures to put this in perspective. In 2023, the UAE exported $2.86 billion of products to Kenya (one of the economic powerhouses of Africa), while the reverse was $716 million. Israeli exports to Kenya, meanwhile, amounted to $41 million, and Kenyan exports to Israel totaled roughly $16 million. Emirati exports to Nigeria totaled just north of $1 billion. Nigeria's exports to the UAE amounted to a slightly higher number ($1.3 billion). Israeli trade with Nigeria is negligible by comparison. In 2023, Israel exported $25 million worth of products to Nigeria, while Israel imported $558 million of Nigerian products. Emirati-South African trade in 2023 totaled over $4 billion in both directions. Israeli-South African trade, for comparison, came out to $230 million in both directions. And even the UAE's (the biggest GCC investor in Africa) investments are dwarfed by China's investments. China exported approximately $30 billion in products to South Africa, $18 billion to Nigeria, and $4.6 billion to Kenya. Needless to say, Israel is on the back foot on a continent that provides massive potential.

Jerusalem could benefit economically from increased engagement with Africa through easier access to African mineral resources and African markets. In the international arena, Israel could court certain actors on the continent and rely upon them for diplomatic protection at the UN. Within the realm of defense and security, there is an untapped market for Israeli weapons. In addition, Africa's strategic geography and proximity to Israel could give it an impetus to further its involvement on the continent. Israel is perfectly positioned to meet the economic and security needs of African states through its world-leading agri-tech industry and its cachet within the global arms market. The Israeli tech industry and Israel's start-up culture can foster innovation and growth in an Africa that is moving into the 21st century.

Angola: Untapped energy and markets

Angola is one of sub-Saharan Africa's biggest oil exporters. Israel, meanwhile, is a net importer of oil. Israel receives most of its oil from four countries: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Gabon, and Brazil. Other countries, like Nigeria and the Republic of the Congo, also export oil to Israel. One of the biggest challenges facing the Angolan oil sector is a lack of proper technology and facilities for extracting and refining oil. In fact, Angola has been unable to sustain higher rates of oil production due to the dearth of modern equipment and facilities. This presents an excellent opportunity for Israel to increase its involvement on the African continent. Israel could upgrade Angola's oil production facilities in exchange for a portion of Angola's oil exports. This is not without historical precedent. In the late 1940s, Israel agreed to send oil drills, oil pipes, and agricultural experts to Romania in exchange for exit visas for tens of thousands of Romanian Jews. Not only could Israel revamp the Angolan oil facilities, but it could also engage in other infrastructure projects in the country. Israel has a long history of sending teams of agricultural and other experts to work in African countries. Angola is a majority-Christian country and no longer part of OPEC, therefore free of two potential sources of pressure. 

Nigeria: A potential security and energy partner

Abuja has the potential to develop a closer business relationship with Jerusalem. Most Christian Nigerians also have Zionist sympathies, facilitating ties between the two. In fact, the two already have some semblance of a security relationship, but there is room for this relationship to evolve. Israel has provided training to Nigerian special operations forces and has inked arms deals with Nigeria in the past. Abuja is actually the largest African importer of Israeli weaponry. In 2006, Nigeria and Israel signed a deal in which the Israelis would provide the Nigerians with air, land, and sea-based surveillance systems. Israel was once poised to sell helicopters to Nigeria, but the United States intervened to stop the deal. Regardless, in April 2025, the Nigerian government reaffirmed its commitment to cooperating with Israel on matters of defense and intelligence. 

Israeli weapons platforms have the added benefit of being "battle-tested." In addition, Israel has the most developed arms industry in the Middle East and North Africa. Israel also has expertise in counterinsurgency conducted against radical Islamists, similar to the war the Nigerian government is fighting against Boko Haram. It is worth mentioning that Turkey is another source of arms for Nigeria. However, Israeli weaponry carries greater cachet than its Turkish counterparts, and the potential exists for Israel to muscle Turkey out of the regional arms market. Jerusalem can export greater quantities of newer and more effective surveillance systems to the Nigerians, along with counterinsurgency training. Again, this has historical precedent. Throughout the Cold War, retired or reservist IDF officers would train and arm proxy forces and states in the Middle East and Africa. Jerusalem can also export its world-leading agri-tech to Nigeria. Israel gains another friend at the UN and another oil source, and Nigeria gets assistance in improving its security situation along with increased foreign investment. 

Rwanda, Senegal, and Kenya: possible pillars of Israeli Africa policy

Post-genocide Rwanda has emerged as one of Israel's most strident allies on the African continent. Paul Kagame, in particular, has a positive view of Israel. In Kagame's eyes, Israel could serve as a possible partner in checking the influence of Islamic fundamentalism in Africa. Another element of Paul Kagame's foreign policy is his pro-American orientation. Fostering good relations with Israel was part of fostering good relations with Washington. Kigali also sees in Israel an example worthy of emulating, especially its startup culture and its high-tech sector. The Israelis have also exported agri-tech to Rwanda. Unsurprisingly, Jerusalem has exported arms to Kigali, too. Compared to its neighbors, Rwanda is stable and prosperous; thus, there is reason to believe that the Rwandan-Israeli partnership will endure. Current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has incorporated Rwanda into his greater strategy of renewing Israeli ties with Africa. 

Senegal is another potential partner of Israel's in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite being a majority-Muslim country, Dakar maintained warm relations with the Israelis. Senegal already has strong security ties to France and the United States, the Senegalese military having been trained and armed by Paris and Washington. In addition to this, the Senegalese military has a reputation within the region for its professionalism and discipline. Add to this the fact that the armed forces are apolitical and have never been involved in any coups, which makes it an outlier in West Africa. Senegal has even contributed troops to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, making it the only non-Arab state in the coalition. This also gave Senegalese personnel experience operating in the Middle East. Israeli-Senegalese security ties could deepen in the future. Jerusalem could furnish drones and other surveillance equipment. Israel could even provide lethal equipment since Dakar is not currently involved in any ongoing major conflicts in which human rights abuses could present problems. IDF personnel could also cooperate more closely with their Senegalese counterparts, and train them in counterinsurgency tactics acquired through years of real-world experience. The Senegalese, for their part, would gain a new security partner and another source of arms if relations change between Dakar and its patrons (which is a valid concern in the case of Washington, given the mercurial nature of the current administration). Senegal's economy is growing quickly, and the country is comparatively stable and successful. 

Kenya is an economic powerhouse in East Africa and sub-Saharan Africa in general. Additionally, Kenya has close ties with the United States and even with Israel. During the Entebbe raid in July 1976, Nairobi allowed IDF aircraft access to Kenyan airspace en route to and from Uganda. About half of Kenyan adults have a favorable view of Israel, which is a higher number than in some European countries. Just like Nigeria, Kenya is dealing with its own radical Islamic insurgency in the form of Al-Shabaab. Israel can likewise provide counterinsurgency training, share intelligence, and provide non-lethal military equipment. Like Israel and Rwanda, Kenya has a vibrant startup culture. In fact, the government is promoting the growth of startups by offering tax incentives and easier access to credit. Kenya, like Rwanda, wants to emulate the success of the Israeli startup ecosystem. This is another area where Israel can outshine its competitors. Rwanda, Senegal, and Kenya can serve as economic gateways for Israeli goods to the broader African market and as investment hubs. These three countries can also give Jerusalem diplomatic support at the United Nations. Resting Israeli policy upon the pillars of Nairobi, Kigali, and Dakar is tantamount to betting on a group of winners.

I'd like to take some time to discuss one last country: Eritrea. As reprehensible as the current government in Asmara may be, Eritrea is strategically important for Israel. Access to the Red Sea is an economic lifeline for Israel, and establishing a greater military presence there will become more crucial in the future. Establishing a base in Djibouti is out of the question, as Djibouti is an Arab League member and has no relations with Israel. For other political reasons, establishing a base in Sudan is also not a possibility. Jerusalem's options are either Somaliland or Eritrea. Jerusalem's ties with Asmara before 2020 were close. Israel has also been accused of, at best, protecting, and, at worst, aiding and abetting Eritrean government agents targeting Eritrean asylum seekers within Israel. The Israelis have had an ongoing problem with undocumented migrants from Eritrea and Sudan. It is Israel's support for the Eritrean regime that has fomented tensions (and even violent clashes) within Eritrean communities in Israel. It has been alleged that Israel has submarines operating in Eritrean waters. Indeed, Israel has two primary security issues in the Red Sea: the Houthis and the undocumented migrants from Sudan and Eritrea. Increasing its military footprint in the Red Sea would enable Israel to handle these security concerns more effectively. A permanent troop presence in Eritrea would not be feasible. An Israeli military presence in Eritrea would have to take shape through limited naval access agreements. 

How would Israel benefit from this strategy?

Fostering deeper cooperation with states in sub-Saharan Africa has a multitude of benefits for Jerusalem. Israel stands to gain diplomatically, economically, and geopolitically. Deepening cooperation with African states (especially powerhouses like Kenya and Nigeria) could win it more friends in the African Union and the United Nations. This would insulate Israel from the impact of Arab countries' and other anti-Israel states' votes at the UN. Israeli businesses would have greater access to African markets, as well as other potential sources of energy, if any of Israel's oil suppliers decide to cut off the flow of petroleum. Most importantly, Israel would gain much-needed soft power in a strategically vital area of the world. Israel's agricultural technology and its high-tech industry distinguish it from other players on the continent, like Iran and Turkey. On top of this, Jerusalem can serve as a supplier of proven, high-quality military equipment without being as constrained by the same human rights concerns that Washington and Western European capitals face. 

What challenges does Israel face in Africa?

Of course, any major policy decision is going to face roadblocks. In this case, the most obvious roadblock to increased Israeli engagement in Africa is the volatile security situation on the continent. As stated before, Israel can devote more resources and effort toward improving ties with more stable and prosperous African countries. Another obvious roadblock is the high level of corruption that pervades many African governments. To mitigate the risk of economic mismanagement, Israel could work through multilateral entities such as the African Development Bank or West Africa's EBID to distribute economic and other forms of aid. One other challenge that Jerusalem must contend with is the sheer number of players active in Africa. The United States, China, France, Iran, Turkey, and the UAE are also taking part in this 21st-century Scramble for Africa. Israel can cash in on its reputation as a powerhouse in agricultural technology and water technology, as well as its reputation as a global high-tech hub. These are all technologies that African states are in dire need of, and Israel can deliver. Lastly, Jerusalem has to navigate through human rights and reputational concerns (which is nothing new for Israel) associated with cooperating with regimes that have poor human rights records (like Kagame's Rwanda). This can best be done by signing transparent agreements with African states and enabling them to develop their own arms industries. In fact, Nigeria is already developing an indigenous weapons industry. The challenges presented can be surmounted, and this strategy can yield major dividends for Jerusalem.

Conclusion

Israel is underutilizing its potential in Africa. If Jerusalem devotes more energy and resources toward courting Africa, it will improve the country's political, economic, and security outlook. This will not be a one-sided relationship reminiscent of the European colonialism of old, in which only the foreigners will benefit. There are significant bonuses for the Africans, too. African states can get increased investment and more access to technology on par with the West's without the lectures on human rights and democracy that come with Western assistance. Israel should act now to secure a substantial long-term presence in Africa's economic, diplomatic, and security landscape. Do you agree or disagree with this strategy for Jerusalem? Let me know in the comments below!

Further reading:

1: Routledge Handbook on Israel's Foreign Relations by Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfold (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/4lgYDJT)

2: The Star and the Scepter: A Diplomatic History of Israel by Emmanuel Navon (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/3UmHELi)

Who are the Middle East's biggest arms exporters?

Many Middle Eastern countries, especially the Arab countries in the Gulf, spend billions upon billions on defense and defense-related procurement. The United States and other NATO member states have a massive footprint in the Middle Eastern arms market. However, what must be addressed in greater detail is the growing presence that Middle Eastern countries have within the global arms market. Countries like Israel and the UAE have invested heavily in developing indigenous arms industries and even export weapons to countries outside of the Middle East. There are other major players in the Middle Eastern arms market, like Turkey and Iran. In this post, I will answer the following questions: How did the arms industries of these countries develop? What is the outlook for these countries' arms exports going forward?

Israel: King of the hill

To the surprise of absolutely no one, Israel is the biggest weapons exporter in the Middle East. In fact, Israel ranks 8th in global arms exports. As of 2024, Europe was the Israeli arms industry's biggest market. Prior to this, India was Israel's number one customer. The ongoing war in Ukraine stimulated defense spending and production across Europe, and this proved to be a boon for the Israeli defense industry as well. The history of the Israeli arms industry actually dates back to the early 20th century, before the state of Israel was even established. In Mandatory Palestine, the Yishuv maintained underground weapons factories hidden from the British authorities. Due to the educational and wealth gap between the average Jew and the average Arab at the time, the Jews were able to maintain an indigenous arms production capability (however primitive it may have been). As a result of this educational and economic gulf, the Yishuv had a technological edge over its Arab adversaries.

Another factor that gave Israel an impetus to produce weapons locally was the precariousness of its arms supply from outside. For the first two decades of its existence, Israel's patron was France. The French provided weaponry like AMX-30 tanks and Mirage fighter jets to the Israelis, but relations between Paris and Tel Aviv had cooled after the French withdrawal from Algeria and the Six-Day War. The French even held missile boats that were due to be exported to Israel due to an embargo (which the Israelis ended up stealing from their port using special operations commandos). Prominent Israeli weapons include the iconic Uzi submachine gun and the Iron Dome air defense system. It is the latter that has generated major interest in foreign markets in recent years. Countries like the US, UK, Canada, and Finland have purchased either complete Iron Dome systems or portions of Iron Dome technology. 

Israel has sold weapons to countries like the Philippines and Azerbaijan, too. The Israelis were once on the cusp of selling early-warning radar systems to China before the US pressurized Israel into canceling the deal. Israeli firm Elbit Systems (producer of the famed Merkava tank) is one of the world's top-30 defense contractors according to SIPRI. Other noteworthy Israeli defense contractors in the top 100 include Israel Aerospace Industries and Rafael. The revenues of these defense firms have been trending upward. In 2024, annual Israeli arms sales reached a new record. According to figures from Israel's defense ministry, weapons sales in 2024 amounted to more than twice the value of weapons sales five years earlier. Interestingly, Arab countries like the UAE, Morocco, and Bahrain accounted for 12% of Israeli weapons exports. Although some European countries have either canceled procurement deals with Israel or sanctioned Israeli defense firms over Gaza, arms sales have continued to increase. 

The UAE: Arabia's "Little Sparta"

The military of the United Arab Emirates is an anomaly in the Arab world in terms of combat capability and professionalism. In fact, the ruling al-Nahyan dynasty has invested large sums of money and resources into improving the capabilities of the UAE's armed forces and pursuing a more assertive security policy. One component of this is the Emirati defense conglomerate, EDGE. EDGE began as the Emirates Defense Industries Company in 2014. EDGE produces armored land vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and electronic warfare systems (just to name a few products). Another prominent Emirati weapons export is the Caracal pistol. Caracal pistols are in service with countries like Jordan and Bahrain. 

The Emiratis have also exported military hardware to countries like Indonesia. In fact, the UAE is the world's 21st-largest weapons exporter. Emirati defense contractors have worked with prominent American firms like Raytheon and Russian defense firms like VR-Technologies. Despite the presence of an emerging indigenous arms industry, the Emiratis are still heavily dependent upon American and European weapons systems. However, there is hope for the prospects of the UAE's military-industrial complex, as EDGE Group has worked with emerging countries like India and Brazil in co-producing weapons systems. The UAE has signed several arms deals and military cooperation agreements in recent years, indicating that there could be further business opportunities for Emirati defense contractors.   

Turkey: Another regional powerhouse

Turkey is second to Israel in terms of regional arms exports. Like Israel, Turkey built its own defense industry to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers. Recently, Turkish defense contractors have been encountering success in European markets. In late 2024, Turkish firm STM signed an agreement with the Portuguese Navy to build fleet replenishment vessels. This agreement marked Turkey's first sale of a naval vessel to an EU or NATO member state. The majority of Turkish arms exports have gone to countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, like North Macedonia and Ukraine. In 2018, Qatar inked a deal to purchase Bayraktar TB2 drones from Ankara. 

In 2024, Turkey inked a deal with Spain to collaborate in the production of jet trainer aircraft. Turkish drone maker Baykar acquired Italian firm Piaggio Aerospace in June 2025. The transformation of the European security environment after February 2022 has been a boon for Ankara as well. The Turkish also have the advantage of being integrated within the greater European security architecture, while also being far enough away from Europe geographically and politically to have the autonomy to cultivate working relationships with states like Russia and non-EU European states like Albania and North Macedonia. 

Iran: Pariah state aiding other pariahs

Iran's defense sector is hampered by political isolation and strategic dependence on Russia and China (especially the former). The country's armed forces still largely use legacy American equipment, the spare parts for which are extremely difficult to come by. Due to its dependence on Russia and Russia's need for as much military hardware as it can throw at Ukraine, Iran has exported systems like drones (most notably, the Shahed-136) to the Russians. I must mention, however, that the Russians are producing a locally-made variant of the Shahed-136 (known as the Geran-2) in large quantities. The Russians are also able to acquire spare parts for these systems from China rather than Iran. 

The Iranians have been doing their own reverse engineering with Chinese-made platforms (either acquired legally before the strengthening of sanctions or through intermediaries or third countries). Iran has leaned on the strategy of reverse engineering weapons systems rather than creating indigenous platforms from scratch due to cost constraints and Tehran's political and economic isolation. During the confrontations with Israel in 2024 and 2025, Iran's stockpile of medium-range missiles and the cachet of Iranian and Russian weaponry sustained heavy blows. Iran is becoming a less important partner for Russia and China, though the Iranians still need Moscow and Beijing. Iranian arms exports are reported to trend downward in the future, due to declining demand from Russia and Israeli strikes on Iranian military infrastructure.

Conclusion

Four countries dominate the Middle Eastern arms market: Israel, Iran, Turkey, and the UAE. Except for the UAE, these countries have had to build their own arms industries out of necessity. These states have managed not only to supply their own militaries with indigenous weapons, but also to export military hardware to countries as far afield as Europe and North America. The global arms market is witnessing the rise of exporters from the Middle East at the expense of Russia and other established arms suppliers. With countries looking to wean themselves off Russian/Soviet weapons platforms, the arms exporters of the Middle East are well-positioned to take on a more substantial share of the world arms market.

Further Reading

1: Armies of Arabia by Zoltan Barany (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/3IZNwry)

2: Routledge Handbook on Israel's Foreign Relations by Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfold (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/3IRHqcH)

3: The Star and the Scepter by Emmanuel Navon (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/3HjzjoF)

4: The Sword and the Olive by Martin van Creveld (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/4oBp9kj)

Who are Russia's silent partners in the Middle East?

The other day, I was listening to Russia scholar Mark Galeotti’s podcast, In Moscow’s Shadows, and Galeotti made a comment about “Russia’s silent partners in the Middle East.” He mentioned Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE specifically. For context, the topic of the episode was the impact of the Israel-Iran War on Russia. After February of 2022, Russia has been upgrading its ties with the GCC states. The UAE allows sanctioned Russian businesses to operate there. Saudi Arabia and Russia have been cooperating on oil prices, and Russian warships have even been spotted making port calls in Saudi Arabia. Jerusalem, for its part, has maintained a somewhat cordial relationship with Russia in spite of October 7th and Putin’s hosting of a Hamas delegation in Moscow. It is Russia’s relationships with these countries that have more room for growth and evolution, compared to traditional Russian partners like Iran and Syria. Galeotti even made the argument that Iran is becoming increasingly less important to Moscow. In this post, I want to answer the following questions: How have Moscow’s ties with Jerusalem, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi transformed post-2022, and how will they develop going forward?”

Russia-Israel relations after 2022

The relationship between Jerusalem and Moscow has been one that has oscillated between warmth and outright hostility. After 1991, Russia’s relationship with Israel started to blossom into a proper partnership. Russian and Israeli heads of state would visit each other’s countries throughout the 2000s. The War on Terror would facilitate ties between the two as they both had their own radical Islamist threat to contend with. At this time, Putin was still making attempts to build bridges with the West.

Of course, it would be remiss not to mention the people-to-people ties between Israel and Russia. Following the Soviet Union’s collapse in December 1991, a wave of over a million Soviet-Jewish olim arrived in Israel. Israel has the third-largest Russian-speaking diaspora outside of the former Soviet Union. This diaspora maintained significant cultural and business ties to Russia. Several leading Israeli business conglomerates had strong ties to Russia prior to October 2023. Russian-speaking Israelis are heavily represented in the Israeli tech sector (one of the primary drivers of the country’s economy). Russia and Israel even signed a military cooperation agreement in 2010.

Russo-Israeli relations after 2022 are of particular importance to us. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February, Israel did not (and still has not) place economic sanctions on Russia. In fact, Israel still allows flights to and from Russia. As far as Ukraine is concerned, Jerusalem has still not provided Ukraine with lethal aid. Russia, meanwhile, has dialed back its military support for Iran and turned a blind eye to Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets within Syrian territory. Complicating this arrangement and creating the need for further dialogue is the presence of Russian military bases in Syria. 

While Russia is opposed to American and Western intervention in the region, Moscow and Tehran are not marching perfectly in lockstep with each other. Russia is not very enthused about Tehran gaining access to nuclear weapons. Generally, nuclear-armed states do not want other states to acquire nukes. Even more importantly, Russia does not have the means or the desire to throw down with Israel or the U.S. over Iran. The Russians are far too overextended in Ukraine to commit manpower and resources to the Middle East. 

However, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza have marred relations between Israel and Russia. In response to Hamas’ attack on October 7th, 2023, Vladimir Putin described the attacks as “a clear example of the failure of US policy in the Middle East.” He also compared the Israeli blockade of Gaza to the Siege of Leningrad. Also in October of 2023, Putin hosted a Hamas delegation in Moscow at a meeting attended by Iran’s deputy foreign minister. Despite this, Moscow stood by as Iran was pounded by Israeli and American aircraft. Moscow has also not downgraded its relations with Jerusalem or done anything beyond symbolic condemnations. 

To echo Mark Galeotti’s argument, Iran is becoming less important to Russia. Moscow once relied on Tehran’s supply of drones (like the Shahed 136 and others) and other military equipment. At present, however, the Russians have significantly ramped up their domestic drone production. Additionally, China (not Iran) supplies most of the spare parts and technological components required to assemble and maintain Russian weaponry. Tehran needs Moscow more than Moscow needs Tehran. Two of Iran’s geopolitical rivals, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have upgraded their relations with Russia since 2022. Allow me to analyze and contextualize Russia’s relationships with Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.

Moscow and Abu Dhabi’s partnership

Russia has had a hand in the Emirati defense industry for some time. Emirati defense firms have worked in conjunction with companies like the Russian car brand GAZ and defense contractor VR Technologies. The UAE’s military has also purchased Russian equipment, like BMP infantry fighting vehicles. As a matter of fact, the UAE is Russia’s largest trading partner in the Middle East. Trade between Russia and the UAE totaled roughly $10 billion in 2024. After February 2022, relations with Abu Dhabi became a bigger priority for Russian policymakers. In 2021, trade between the two countries amounted to $4.6 billion and ballooned to more than $8 billion in 2022.

Tourism is another component of Russo-Emirati relations. In 2018, 1 million Russians spent over $1 billion in the UAE. After 2022, many Russian businesses moved their operations to the Emirates. On June 1st, 2018, Moscow and Abu Dhabi signed a “Declaration of Strategic Partnership” which called for cooperation in several key areas, including politics, security, and economics. The UAE expressed interest in jointly developing a fifth-generation fighter with Russian firm Rostec. However, numerous challenges have thrown a wrench in the project. 

Abu Dhabi and Moscow have invested in each other’s petrochemical sectors as well. In 2021, Mubadala Investment Company purchased a 1.9% stake in Sibur, Russia’s largest integrated petrochemicals company. Since 2010, Mubadala has invested more than $3 billion in the Russian economy. Diplomacy is another key area of cooperation for the UAE and Russia. It must be noted that the Emiratis abstained from a UN vote condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Like Israel, the UAE has also not imposed economic sanctions on the Russians. A former professor at Abu Dhabi’s National Defense College said the following about Moscow’s relationship with the Emiratis: “The UAE sees Russia as a very reliable partner as opposed to western countries who have to defer to parliaments and civil society pressure.” In other words, Russia is willing to work with the Emiratis without giving grandiose lectures about human rights or worrying about pressure from constituents and lobbyists. As both countries have expanded their footprint in places like the Red Sea, there will be a greater basis for cooperation between the two. 

Saudi Arabia’s cooperation with Russia

Russia and Saudi Arabia share many similarities. Both are authoritarian rentier states that are oil superpowers. Both countries’ actions against dissidents have soured their relations with the United States and the West in general. In fact, Saudi Arabia and Russia have cooperated with each other in the past. In 1926, the USSR was the first country to recognize the Kingdom of Hijaz and Nejd (as Saudi Arabia was called before 1932). Just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries furnished billions in aid money to Moscow. Still, it must be mentioned that these were brief aberrations in the Saudi-Russian relationship. Relations between the two countries were, on the whole, hostile. The Soviets’ anti-monarchical and anti-religious ethos alienated them from Riyadh and the other Gulf monarchies.

Following the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Riyadh and Moscow condemned the coalition’s military actions against Iraq. This was particularly interesting given that Saudi Arabia was (and still is) one of America’s biggest security partners in the Middle East and had fallen victim to Iraqi aggression in 1991. Saudi imports from Russia amounted to nearly $4 billion in 2023. In 2024, bilateral trade between Saudi Arabia and Russia increased by 62%. Trade turnover between the two countries went up fourfold in the first quarter of 2025. 

Defense cooperation is another key element of Russo-Saudi ties. The Saudis signed a contract with Russian firm Rosoboronexport to produce TOS-1A heavy flamethrower systems locally in Saudi Arabia. Saudi state-owned defense company Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) has also licensed the Kornet anti-tank missile and secured a licensing agreement to locally make the AK-103 assault rifle. In a quiet deal that flew under the radar, the Russians agreed to supply the Saudis with 39 Pantsir-S1M mobile air defense systems as well. The deal was reported to be worth over $2 billion. 

Author Mark N. Katz had this to say about Russo-Saudi ties: “While Saudi Arabia and Russia have important objectives toward each other, both have limited means for pursuing them. Relations between them have never been so good that one or both would alter its policies for the sake of maintaining good relations with the other…He goes on to say: “…and since the end of the Cold War neither has been in a position to impose sufficient costs upon the other to compel it to change its policies.” Regardless, cooperation and coordination in the realms of energy and security could deepen given Russia’s current antagonistic relationship with the United States, Saudi Arabia’s desire for partners who won’t stick their nose into the Kingdom’s internal affairs, as well as America’s desire to pivot away from the Middle East.

Since the start of the 21st century, Moscow has lost three important regional partners (Iraq, Libya, and Syria) and has signaled that even Iran is becoming less of a foreign policy priority. Despite this, there are opportunities for Russia to build new friendships and work together with other states in the region. The Gulf monarchies, for their part, recognize that they cannot solely depend upon Washington for their security needs. Israel, meanwhile, due to its strong people-to-people ties with Russia and the close proximity between Russian and Israeli military forces, realizes that it cannot afford to completely alienate Russia (and vice versa). It is Russia’s ties with Riyadh, Jerusalem, and Abu Dhabi that will be the relationships worthy of close examination in the coming years. 

Further reading:

1: Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors by Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/4f3c3ru)

2: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates: Foreign Policy and Strategic Alliances in an Uncertain World by Robert Mason (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/4m3Tw0w)

3: Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation by Neil Partrick (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/40qStj0)

Why the Gulf states can't buy soft power

On my Instagram account (@egs_1998), I have made posts related to Qatar's soft power. One of my most recent posts discussed the limits and shortcomings of Qatari soft power. In this post, I will expand upon my posts on Qatari soft power and discuss soft power in the GCC more broadly. More specifically, I am going to focus on the efforts made by the GCC states to "buy" culture and soft power. Some Gulf states adhere to this formula more strictly than others. Therefore, I will spend my time talking about Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, the three economic heavyweights in the GCC.

The shortcomings of Doha's soft power

The case of Qatar is the most notable example of Gulf countries adopting the strategy mentioned above. Apart from its role in the region as a mediator, Doha is positioning itself to play a more prominent role in international affairs. If you watch Formula 1 like me, or soccer, you've probably seen jerseys and displays emblazoned with "Qatar Airways" or the "Qatar Foundation." Qatar Airways, in fact, has a reputation for excellence. As we all know, Qatar was selected to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup. I argue that the choice of Qatar as the host country for the World Cup did more to harm the country's image than improve it. I will expand on this later in the post. Suffice it to say that it takes more than hosting major sporting events to generate (for lack of a better term) tangible soft power.

One also cannot deny the global reach and impact of the Qatari state-owned news network, Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera has an audience of 430 million homes in 150 countries. For comparison, the Saudi state-owned news network, Al Arabiya, has an audience numbering over 180 million across its social media accounts, which is mostly concentrated within the Arab world. On a more eyebrow-raising level, Qatar is the largest foreign donor to American universities. There are even American universities with campuses in Qatar. Some of the biggest recipients of Qatari donations include Carnegie Mellon University, Cornell University, and Texas A&M. According to a 2023 report by the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, the Qataris have given more than $3 billion to American colleges. This sounds great for such a small country with limited natural resources (other than hydrocarbons). Still, there are limits to Doha's strategy of purchasing culture and influence.

According to a YouGov poll conducted in 2017 during Doha's diplomatic spat with the rest of the GCC, 27% of Americans thought of Qatar as an ally. However, 31% of Americans viewed Qatar as an enemy. An even higher percentage of Americans (44%) view Al Jazeera as a platform for Muslim extremists. If you ask the average American about Qatar, you will be met with either confusion or a negative response related to Qatar's human rights abuses, support for radical Islamists, or its ultra-conservative social laws. Meanwhile, if you ask an American about Japan, you will likely get an answer related to anime/manga, JDM cars, sushi, or J-rock/J-pop. Ask the average American about South Korea and you'll get a response related to K-pop, K-dramas, or Korean cuisine. This is what "soft power" really means.

What world-famous musicians or actors have come from Qatar? How many world-famous athletes hail from Qatar? What has Qatar contributed to Hollywood? Money alone does not generate soft power and good PR. One excellent case in point is Jamaica. As a small and poor island nation, Jamaica has had a significant impact on music all around the world. Other than being the home of reggae, it is partially because of Jamaican immigrants that hip-hop exists. Jamaica is the birthplace of ska as well. Many Americans could probably name at least one famous Jamaican or person of Jamaican descent. As I stated above, the hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar did more to damage the country's reputation than improve it. The use of modern-day slave labor in preparing the country for the World Cup and the ultra-puritanical laws that visitors were subject to left a bad taste in the mouths of many foreigners. Qatar's much larger neighbor, Saudi Arabia, shares many similarities with the former.

Saudi Arabia's uphill battle to change its image

Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), Riyadh has tried to distance itself from its ties to radical Islam and present itself as a bastion of moderate Islam. In an Instagram post I made back in February, I made the argument that modern-day Saudi Arabia should not be considered a theocracy. Rather, Saudi Arabia should be labelled as an "Islamic absolute monarchy." A fitting (albeit imperfect) analogue would be the Holy Roman Empire. In both Saudi Arabia and the Holy Roman Empire, religion and politics were deeply intertwined. Both drew political legitimacy from religious authorities (the Wahhabi cleric and the Catholic Church, respectively). Religious officials also held major political sway. While there are differences between the two, I doubt that most historians would label the Holy Roman Empire as a theocracy. Regardless, I am sure this argument is still a hard sell for the casual observer. Riyadh faces an uphill battle in revamping its image.

Since the Saudi monarchy relies on religion for legitimacy and exercises custodianship of the two holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, Riyadh cannot completely jettison its ties to religion. The fact that 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudis and that Osama bin Laden was a Saudi also did not help Riyadh's PR. While Saudi Arabia has relaxed some of its conservative social policies and has taken steps to improve its relationship with non-Muslims, Riyadh cannot escape its reputation as a puritanical totalitarian state. Interestingly, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar adhere to the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). 

Out of the four Sunni fiqhs, the Hanbali school is the most conservative and has the most extreme interpretations of Islamic law. Until 2020, the Saudis would finance the building of mosques abroad that propagated Wahhabi thought and doctrine (in a manner acceptable to the Saudi monarchy). Although the plug was pulled on the construction of overseas mosques as part of the monarchy's larger foreign policy reorientation, Riyadh still retains significant cachet in the Islamic world. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation, founded in 1969 by King Faisal, is headquartered in Jeddah. The Islamic Development Bank, also founded with the support of King Faisal, is based in Jeddah as well. Through the IDB, Riyadh buys its way into currying favor with other majority-Muslim countries.

The announcement of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's ambitious Vision 2030 was a major turning point for Riyadh's foreign policy. According to Vision 2030's official website: "To achieve true happiness and fulfillment for all citizens and residents, we are prioritizing physical, psychological, and social wellbeing, which is why at the heart of our vision is creating a society where everyone enjoys a high quality of life, a healthy lifestyle, and an attractive living environment." Another goal of Vision 2030 is to increase foreign investment in Saudi Arabia. Creating an "attractive living environment" and increasing foreign direct investment, in my opinion, will prove difficult.

Allow me to share some statistics on Americans' views of the kingdom and how these relate to Saudi soft power and policy. According to a 2019 Gallup poll, only 4% of Americans had a "very favorable" view of Saudi Arabia, and 25% had a "somewhat favorable" view of the kingdom. Those numbers are lower than Venezuela's and Cuba's. Riyadh has been lavishing funds on infrastructure projects that have more visual value than actual practical function ("The Line" being one noteworthy example). The fact that these projects are constructed using the 21st-century equivalent of coolie labor creates just as much, if not more, negative press for the Saudis than any positive press that the project itself would generate. The Saudis are good at throwing money at their foreign policy objectives, but they are not good at attracting and persuading other countries and peoples toward their goals.

The UAE: Petrodollars spent right

Lastly, I would like to take some time to delve into the UAE's relationship with soft power. While the UAE is plagued by many of the same issues as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the UAE has been able to wield soft power more effectively than Riyadh and Doha. Firstly, the UAE has become less reliant upon oil revenues (though they still make up 30% of GDP) compared to the other two monarchies. In addition to this, the UAE is a hub for tourists around the world and is known for its business-friendly environment. Additionally, the UAE is known for its tough stance on Islamist terrorist groups and promotion of religious harmony. This cannot be said of Doha and Riyadh. Of course, Formula 1 and soccer fans alike have seen advertisements for Emirates, Etihad Airways, and Mubadala Investment Company. In the case of the UAE, they have been able to utilize soft power more effectively than the Saudis and Qataris due to the fact that there is a coherent long-term vision for the country beyond oil. The Al-Nahyan dynasty wants to not only diversify the country's economy but also become a global tech leader and a bastion of tolerance and social cohesion in the Gulf (among other goals). The Emiratis, relative to Riyadh and Doha, have done more than simply attempt to buy themselves positive press.

You might be wondering what soft power has to do with energy and security policy, so let me connect the dots. A country's soft power and its ability to portray itself and its policy priorities favorably in the international community are influential factors in international relations. A perfect case in point is the Israeli-Arab normalization process. The way Israel is viewed in the Arab street and the baggage associated with Israel have impeded normalization talks with other Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia. In the case of a liberal democracy, it is easier to sell a war or send foreign aid to help a country that most of your constituents have a positive opinion toward. Another case in point is America's security relationship with Israel. Over the last year and a half, Americans have become increasingly squeamish about weapons sales and military aid to Israel. American public opinion of Israel has also become more negative since October 7th. In contrast, most Americans view the NATO alliance favorably and favor America remaining a part of it. One of the reasons for this is that the countries that make up NATO are, on the whole, viewed positively by Americans. Countries like Germany, France, Italy, and the UK have their own forms of soft power. Americans are much more amenable to sending military and economic assistance to countries like the EU member states, Japan, or South Korea. 

Conclusion

The Gulf monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have been transformed by oil revenues. While these countries are taking steps to diversify their economies away from dependence on hydrocarbons, they are still relying on oil money as a proxy for actual diplomacy and developing proper soft power. A country, no matter how wealthy, cannot buy soft power. Also, military force cannot produce soft power. If a country is viewed overwhelmingly negatively as a 12th-century absolutist kingdom in 21st-century clothes, that will (especially in democratic societies) complicate doing business and cooperating on regional issues. The UAE and its ruling dynasty appear to have recognized this more than the Qatari and Saudi monarchies.

Further reading:

Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation by Neil Partrick (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/40dllv0)

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates: Foreign policy and strategic alliances in an uncertain world by Robert Mason (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/40hULAR)

Why Israel's natural gas exports could increase

Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir once joked that "It took Moses 40 years to find the only place in the Middle East that has no oil." Upon its inception, the state of Israel was hamstrung by the Arab world's dominance of the global oil and gas markets and its own lack of energy resources. Today, however, Israel is an energy exporter and has transformed the regional energy market and geoeconomic landscape. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has proven to be a boon for the Israeli energy sector, as various countries in Europe are looking to reduce their reliance on Russian energy. With this increased economic stature as an energy supplier (albeit a comparatively small one) comes increased diplomatic stature as well. Israeli energy exports have been increasing rapidly in recent years, and there is sufficient cause to believe that even greater opportunities will arise for Israel's energy sector in the future.

Energy: Israel's Achilles' heel

Iran would also emerge as one of Israel's main oil suppliers. Oil imports from Iran once made up the majority of Israel's oil imports until the revolution of 1979. Before the 1979 revolution, Iran's diplomatic and energy policies were more pro-Western in alignment. Tehran was once a partner of America in the region. This disruption of the flow of Iranian oil forced Tel Aviv to diversify its oil sources. Since such a significant portion of the world's oil originated (and still originates) from the Arab world, the oil-producing Arab states could use their dominance of the market as a tool for political blackmail. The most notable example of this "oil weapon" being utilized was the oil embargo following the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Since then, however, other oil-producing states have gone on to acquire greater shares of the global market. This has had the effect of countering and blunting the effects of the Arab "oil weapon."

Following the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, the former agreed to export crude oil to the latter. Oil from Egypt would serve to make up the shortfall resulting from Iran's cutting of ties. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Russia would emerge as a dependable exporter of energy to the Israelis. In fact, Israel's primary oil suppliers are former Soviet states (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan). The African country of Gabon is likewise a major source of oil for Israel. Nearly a quarter of the country's oil comes from Gabon and other African states like Nigeria and Congo-Brazzaville. In 2009, the Middle Eastern energy landscape was permanently altered after a large natural gas field was discovered off the Israeli coast.

From dependency to net exporter

The Tamar gas field is estimated to contain 200 BCM of natural gas, equaling more than half of what the entire EU consumes annually. In 2010, the Leviathan gas field was discovered west of Haifa. This gas field contained more than twice the amount of natural gas (500 BCM). Both the Tamar and Leviathan fields transformed Israel into a net exporter of energy. As a consequence of these discoveries, Israel's standing, both geoeconomically and geopolitically, was elevated. In October 2016, the partners in charge of the Leviathan gas field inked an agreement to sell gas to Jordan. Jordan imports nearly all of its energy requirements, and most of that energy comes from natural gas. Israel would also export energy to its other neighbor, Egypt. 

Israel has been in talks with countries like Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus to construct gas pipelines. These talks, though, have gone nowhere. Building a natural gas pipeline from Israel to Europe presents serious logistical and political challenges. The ongoing disputes in Cyprus and the Middle Eastern geopolitical situation have complicated this. The proposed EastMed (Eastern Mediterranean) natural gas pipeline was to connect the Israeli natural gas fields with Cyprus and Greece. Unfortunately, the pipeline ran into political roadblocks in the form of continued Turkish objections and withdrawal of American support in 2022. Despite that, there is ample reason to be optimistic about the prospects of Israel's energy sector. In 2024, despite the war in Gaza and other regional flashpoints, Israeli natural gas exports to Egypt and Jordan jumped by more than 13%. 

Even more important, however, is the possibility of Israeli natural gas exports to the European Union. In June 2022, Egypt, Israel, and the EU signed a memorandum of understanding "on the transport, trade and export of natural gas to the European Union." US President Donald Trump has also announced his plan to include Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia in the Abraham Accords. The signing of the MoU with the EU, the staying power of the ceasefire between Jerusalem and Tehran, and the potential for normalization with more Arab states could have positive consequences for Israel's natural gas sector. Additionally, if the Abraham Accords are expanded to include Syria and Lebanon, there will be opportunities for the Israelis to break into new markets. Syria and Lebanon are both heavily dependent on energy imports from abroad. There is more talk of possible Israeli energy sales to the Far East as well. The Far East and South Asia have massive potential as a market for Israeli natural gas due to the rapid growth of countries like China and India. Additionally, Israel has close ties to New Delhi and an amicable relationship with Beijing. 

The discovery of natural gas off Israel's coast was transformative for the country's economy and geopolitical standing. With the Global South playing catch-up, there could be more opportunities for the Israeli energy sector to exploit new markets. Developments in the Middle East could grease the skids for increased trade and cooperation with EU member states, thirsty for non-Russian gas. On the other hand, Israeli military actions in the future could undo this progress. Going forward, Israel-EU and Israel-East/South Asia trade patterns and energy policy will be interesting to watch. Moses may have led the Israelites to the only place in the Middle East with no oil, but Israel is a land of milk and honey when it comes to natural gas.

Further reading:

1: The Star and the Scepter by Emmanuel Navon (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/4kp1gZM)

2: The Routledge Handbook on Israel's Foreign Relations by Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfold (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/4069n69)

Who REALLY won the Israel-Iran War?

Both Israel and Iran have claimed victory in their recent round of fighting, but what do the facts on the ground say? For 12 days in June 2025, Israel and Iran engaged in tit-for-tat exchanges with air strikes and missile attacks. The climax of this war came when the United States decided to enter the war on the side of Israel. President Donald Trump authorized a US strike on Iran's nuclear facilities with B-2 bombers, dramatically escalating the conflict. This was not the first time Tehran and Jerusalem exchanged blows. In April and October 2024, Iran fired missiles at Israel (prompting Israeli retribution). These attacks resulted in minimal Israeli casualties, though. There was considerable concern that this war would disrupt the flow of oil and affect global oil prices. Fortunately, the war and the economic shocks associated with it were not as detrimental as initially thought. That said, the Israel-Iran War of June 2025 had broader implications for not only the participants but the region more generally.

Of course, both Tehran and Jerusalem have claimed victory over the other. We have to look past the peacocking and acknowledge the geopolitical and geoeconomic realities on the ground. Neither Jerusalem nor Tehran has emerged victorious from this war. Neither side has sufficient means to deal a decisive death blow against the other. The Israelis and the Iranians have both failed to achieve their strategic objectives in this war. Israel and even the United States have proven unable to permanently handicap Iran's nuclear program. Iran, for its part, cannot inflict a high enough military cost on the Israelis to deter their aggression. Indeed, the recent war resulted in minimal IDF casualties and Israeli air supremacy over Iranian airspace. Jerusalem still views Iran as an existential threat that needs to be dealt with once and for all. While there is a return to normalcy for the time being, this is far from the end of the confrontation between Israel and Iran. I feel it necessary to discuss the different tools that the Israelis and Iranians have at their disposal and the limitations that both countries face. On paper, though, it appears that Jerusalem currently has the stronger hand of the two.

What can Israel do?

All it takes is one look at a map to see that Israel is the smaller of the two powers, geographically and demographically. Regardless, there are several key advantages that the Israelis have over Iran. These are not all advantages directly related to military strength. First, the Israeli economy is bigger and more integrated with global markets than that of Iran. Israel's world-famous tech sector dwarfs anything Iran can muster. The Israeli economy is more diversified than the sanctioned and oil-dependent Iranian economy. Of course, the Israeli economy has its weaknesses. The period following October 7th, 2023, has been a period of economic decline in Israel. The start of the current round of hostilities between Israel and Hamas wrought havoc on Israel's economy. In 2023, the Israeli economy grew by 2%. In 2024, Israel's economy grew by 1%. What is more interesting is that emigration from Israel has increased. Approximately 83,000 Israelis emigrated from Israel in 2024, and only 33,000 migrated to Israel. The IDF has been experiencing manpower shortages as well. War with Iran and its proxies has put a squeeze on Israel's economy. 

What can Iran do? 

Iran, until recently, could act against Israel via its proxies in the Middle East. However, the operational capabilities of these proxy groups have been greatly degraded over the past year. Iranian-supported Shia militant group, Hezbollah, even opted to stay out of the Israel-Iran War. Make no mistake, if hostilities commence again between Tehran and Jerusalem, the conflict will not take the shape of a conventional shooting war between Israeli and Iranian troops. Iran and Israel's conflict will mostly be limited to air and missile strikes against one another. The shadow war between the two is likely to continue as well. In the absence of direct military confrontation between Jerusalem and Tehran, the latter will still conduct operations against soft Jewish/Israeli targets around the world. In fact, Tehran has done this before. Iranian nationals were arrested in connection with a bomb plot targeting Israeli diplomats in Thailand back in 2012. After October 7th, 2023, Mossad and Brazilian police uncovered Hezbollah plots against Jewish individuals and sites in Brazil. Israel, for its part, will more than likely act against Iranian proxy groups and individuals connected to the Iranian security apparatus. Like Iran, Israel has a long history of this type of activity.

The war's real winners

Other players in the region have gained from the recent fighting between Iran and Israel. I am mainly referring to the Arab monarchies in the GCC. Other than the underwhelming Iranian missile attack on Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the Gulf monarchies have come out of the recent conflict unscathed. The GCC monarchies have the most to gain from this. These countries are taking the opportunity to position themselves as major players in the realm of regional diplomacy. Oman had hosted talks between the United States and Iran prior to the outbreak of the war. Oman and Qatar, in particular, have played mediator roles for decades. Muscat and Doha are the most Iran-friendly countries within the GCC. These countries have close ties with both Iran and the West. The war with Israel has also exhausted resources that Iran could use against the Gulf states, whether that be through direct Iranian strike capabilities or through proxies like the Houthis. The Arab petrostates of the Gulf are also able to portray themselves as stable and dependable oil suppliers compared to states like Iran, Russia, and Venezuela. Out of all of the players in the region, the GCC states were the big winners in this war.

Relations between the GCC and Iran will be important to watch in the coming months, especially the latter's relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman. It must be stated that it is in the best interests of the GCC monarchies for neither Tehran nor Jerusalem to achieve a clear-cut victory over the other if war breaks out once again. Israel's goal of regime change in Iran would pose a danger to the security of these monarchies. If the regime in Tehran were overthrown, there is no guarantee that whatever replaces it will be any more friendly to the GCC countries. Iran, another hegemonic threat, through its arming and funding of proxy forces, likewise threatens regional stability and the ambitions of countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The increased political stature of the GCC countries is one result of the ongoing tension between Iran and Israel, but it remains to be seen if they can skillfully use this stature to defuse regional tensions.

Further reading:

1: Armies of Arabia by Zoltan Barany (PURCHASE HERE: https://amzn.to/4l4icFW)

2: Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia: Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East by Robert Mason (PURCHASE HERE: https://amzn.to/4l1t1Zj)