The other day, I was listening to Russia scholar Mark Galeotti’s podcast, In Moscow’s Shadows, and Galeotti made a comment about “Russia’s silent partners in the Middle East.” He mentioned Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE specifically. For context, the topic of the episode was the impact of the Israel-Iran War on Russia. After February of 2022, Russia has been upgrading its ties with the GCC states. The UAE allows sanctioned Russian businesses to operate there. Saudi Arabia and Russia have been cooperating on oil prices, and Russian warships have even been spotted making port calls in Saudi Arabia. Jerusalem, for its part, has maintained a somewhat cordial relationship with Russia in spite of October 7th and Putin’s hosting of a Hamas delegation in Moscow. It is Russia’s relationships with these countries that have more room for growth and evolution, compared to traditional Russian partners like Iran and Syria. Galeotti even made the argument that Iran is becoming increasingly less important to Moscow. In this post, I want to answer the following questions: How have Moscow’s ties with Jerusalem, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi transformed post-2022, and how will they develop going forward?”
Russia-Israel relations after 2022
The relationship between Jerusalem and Moscow has been one that has oscillated between warmth and outright hostility. After 1991, Russia’s relationship with Israel started to blossom into a proper partnership. Russian and Israeli heads of state would visit each other’s countries throughout the 2000s. The War on Terror would facilitate ties between the two as they both had their own radical Islamist threat to contend with. At this time, Putin was still making attempts to build bridges with the West.
Of course, it would be remiss not to mention the people-to-people ties between Israel and Russia. Following the Soviet Union’s collapse in December 1991, a wave of over a million Soviet-Jewish olim arrived in Israel. Israel has the third-largest Russian-speaking diaspora outside of the former Soviet Union. This diaspora maintained significant cultural and business ties to Russia. Several leading Israeli business conglomerates had strong ties to Russia prior to October 2023. Russian-speaking Israelis are heavily represented in the Israeli tech sector (one of the primary drivers of the country’s economy). Russia and Israel even signed a military cooperation agreement in 2010.
Russo-Israeli relations after 2022 are of particular importance to us. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February, Israel did not (and still has not) place economic sanctions on Russia. In fact, Israel still allows flights to and from Russia. As far as Ukraine is concerned, Jerusalem has still not provided Ukraine with lethal aid. Russia, meanwhile, has dialed back its military support for Iran and turned a blind eye to Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets within Syrian territory. Complicating this arrangement and creating the need for further dialogue is the presence of Russian military bases in Syria.
While Russia is opposed to American and Western intervention in the region, Moscow and Tehran are not marching perfectly in lockstep with each other. Russia is not very enthused about Tehran gaining access to nuclear weapons. Generally, nuclear-armed states do not want other states to acquire nukes. Even more importantly, Russia does not have the means or the desire to throw down with Israel or the U.S. over Iran. The Russians are far too overextended in Ukraine to commit manpower and resources to the Middle East.
However, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza have marred relations between Israel and Russia. In response to Hamas’ attack on October 7th, 2023, Vladimir Putin described the attacks as “a clear example of the failure of US policy in the Middle East.” He also compared the Israeli blockade of Gaza to the Siege of Leningrad. Also in October of 2023, Putin hosted a Hamas delegation in Moscow at a meeting attended by Iran’s deputy foreign minister. Despite this, Moscow stood by as Iran was pounded by Israeli and American aircraft. Moscow has also not downgraded its relations with Jerusalem or done anything beyond symbolic condemnations.
To echo Mark Galeotti’s argument, Iran is becoming less important to Russia. Moscow once relied on Tehran’s supply of drones (like the Shahed 136 and others) and other military equipment. At present, however, the Russians have significantly ramped up their domestic drone production. Additionally, China (not Iran) supplies most of the spare parts and technological components required to assemble and maintain Russian weaponry. Tehran needs Moscow more than Moscow needs Tehran. Two of Iran’s geopolitical rivals, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have upgraded their relations with Russia since 2022. Allow me to analyze and contextualize Russia’s relationships with Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.
Moscow and Abu Dhabi’s partnership
Russia has had a hand in the Emirati defense industry for some time. Emirati defense firms have worked in conjunction with companies like the Russian car brand GAZ and defense contractor VR Technologies. The UAE’s military has also purchased Russian equipment, like BMP infantry fighting vehicles. As a matter of fact, the UAE is Russia’s largest trading partner in the Middle East. Trade between Russia and the UAE totaled roughly $10 billion in 2024. After February 2022, relations with Abu Dhabi became a bigger priority for Russian policymakers. In 2021, trade between the two countries amounted to $4.6 billion and ballooned to more than $8 billion in 2022.
Tourism is another component of Russo-Emirati relations. In 2018, 1 million Russians spent over $1 billion in the UAE. After 2022, many Russian businesses moved their operations to the Emirates. On June 1st, 2018, Moscow and Abu Dhabi signed a “Declaration of Strategic Partnership” which called for cooperation in several key areas, including politics, security, and economics. The UAE expressed interest in jointly developing a fifth-generation fighter with Russian firm Rostec. However, numerous challenges have thrown a wrench in the project.
Abu Dhabi and Moscow have invested in each other’s petrochemical sectors as well. In 2021, Mubadala Investment Company purchased a 1.9% stake in Sibur, Russia’s largest integrated petrochemicals company. Since 2010, Mubadala has invested more than $3 billion in the Russian economy. Diplomacy is another key area of cooperation for the UAE and Russia. It must be noted that the Emiratis abstained from a UN vote condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Like Israel, the UAE has also not imposed economic sanctions on the Russians. A former professor at Abu Dhabi’s National Defense College said the following about Moscow’s relationship with the Emiratis: “The UAE sees Russia as a very reliable partner as opposed to western countries who have to defer to parliaments and civil society pressure.” In other words, Russia is willing to work with the Emiratis without giving grandiose lectures about human rights or worrying about pressure from constituents and lobbyists. As both countries have expanded their footprint in places like the Red Sea, there will be a greater basis for cooperation between the two.
Russia and Saudi Arabia share many similarities. Both are authoritarian rentier states that are oil superpowers. Both countries’ actions against dissidents have soured their relations with the United States and the West in general. In fact, Saudi Arabia and Russia have cooperated with each other in the past. In 1926, the USSR was the first country to recognize the Kingdom of Hijaz and Nejd (as Saudi Arabia was called before 1932). Just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries furnished billions in aid money to Moscow. Still, it must be mentioned that these were brief aberrations in the Saudi-Russian relationship. Relations between the two countries were, on the whole, hostile. The Soviets’ anti-monarchical and anti-religious ethos alienated them from Riyadh and the other Gulf monarchies.
Following the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Riyadh and Moscow condemned the coalition’s military actions against Iraq. This was particularly interesting given that Saudi Arabia was (and still is) one of America’s biggest security partners in the Middle East and had fallen victim to Iraqi aggression in 1991. Saudi imports from Russia amounted to nearly $4 billion in 2023. In 2024, bilateral trade between Saudi Arabia and Russia increased by 62%. Trade turnover between the two countries went up fourfold in the first quarter of 2025.
Defense cooperation is another key element of Russo-Saudi ties. The Saudis signed a contract with Russian firm Rosoboronexport to produce TOS-1A heavy flamethrower systems locally in Saudi Arabia. Saudi state-owned defense company Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) has also licensed the Kornet anti-tank missile and secured a licensing agreement to locally make the AK-103 assault rifle. In a quiet deal that flew under the radar, the Russians agreed to supply the Saudis with 39 Pantsir-S1M mobile air defense systems as well. The deal was reported to be worth over $2 billion.
Author Mark N. Katz had this to say about Russo-Saudi ties: “While Saudi Arabia and Russia have important objectives toward each other, both have limited means for pursuing them. Relations between them have never been so good that one or both would alter its policies for the sake of maintaining good relations with the other…He goes on to say: “…and since the end of the Cold War neither has been in a position to impose sufficient costs upon the other to compel it to change its policies.” Regardless, cooperation and coordination in the realms of energy and security could deepen given Russia’s current antagonistic relationship with the United States, Saudi Arabia’s desire for partners who won’t stick their nose into the Kingdom’s internal affairs, as well as America’s desire to pivot away from the Middle East.
Since the start of the 21st century, Moscow has lost three important regional partners (Iraq, Libya, and Syria) and has signaled that even Iran is becoming less of a foreign policy priority. Despite this, there are opportunities for Russia to build new friendships and work together with other states in the region. The Gulf monarchies, for their part, recognize that they cannot solely depend upon Washington for their security needs. Israel, meanwhile, due to its strong people-to-people ties with Russia and the close proximity between Russian and Israeli military forces, realizes that it cannot afford to completely alienate Russia (and vice versa). It is Russia’s ties with Riyadh, Jerusalem, and Abu Dhabi that will be the relationships worthy of close examination in the coming years.
Further reading:
1: Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors by Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/4f3c3ru)
2: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates: Foreign Policy and Strategic Alliances in an Uncertain World by Robert Mason (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/4m3Tw0w)
3: Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation by Neil Partrick (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/40qStj0)
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