Why the Gulf states can't buy soft power

On my Instagram account (@egs_1998), I have made posts related to Qatar's soft power. One of my most recent posts discussed the limits and shortcomings of Qatari soft power. In this post, I will expand upon my posts on Qatari soft power and discuss soft power in the GCC more broadly. More specifically, I am going to focus on the efforts made by the GCC states to "buy" culture and soft power. Some Gulf states adhere to this formula more strictly than others. Therefore, I will spend my time talking about Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, the three economic heavyweights in the GCC.

The shortcomings of Doha's soft power

The case of Qatar is the most notable example of Gulf countries adopting the strategy mentioned above. Apart from its role in the region as a mediator, Doha is positioning itself to play a more prominent role in international affairs. If you watch Formula 1 like me, or soccer, you've probably seen jerseys and displays emblazoned with "Qatar Airways" or the "Qatar Foundation." Qatar Airways, in fact, has a reputation for excellence. As we all know, Qatar was selected to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup. I argue that the choice of Qatar as the host country for the World Cup did more to harm the country's image than improve it. I will expand on this later in the post. Suffice it to say that it takes more than hosting major sporting events to generate (for lack of a better term) tangible soft power.

One also cannot deny the global reach and impact of the Qatari state-owned news network, Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera has an audience of 430 million homes in 150 countries. For comparison, the Saudi state-owned news network, Al Arabiya, has an audience numbering over 180 million across its social media accounts, which is mostly concentrated within the Arab world. On a more eyebrow-raising level, Qatar is the largest foreign donor to American universities. There are even American universities with campuses in Qatar. Some of the biggest recipients of Qatari donations include Carnegie Mellon University, Cornell University, and Texas A&M. According to a 2023 report by the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, the Qataris have given more than $3 billion to American colleges. This sounds great for such a small country with limited natural resources (other than hydrocarbons). Still, there are limits to Doha's strategy of purchasing culture and influence.

According to a YouGov poll conducted in 2017 during Doha's diplomatic spat with the rest of the GCC, 27% of Americans thought of Qatar as an ally. However, 31% of Americans viewed Qatar as an enemy. An even higher percentage of Americans (44%) view Al Jazeera as a platform for Muslim extremists. If you ask the average American about Qatar, you will be met with either confusion or a negative response related to Qatar's human rights abuses, support for radical Islamists, or its ultra-conservative social laws. Meanwhile, if you ask an American about Japan, you will likely get an answer related to anime/manga, JDM cars, sushi, or J-rock/J-pop. Ask the average American about South Korea and you'll get a response related to K-pop, K-dramas, or Korean cuisine. This is what "soft power" really means.

What world-famous musicians or actors have come from Qatar? How many world-famous athletes hail from Qatar? What has Qatar contributed to Hollywood? Money alone does not generate soft power and good PR. One excellent case in point is Jamaica. As a small and poor island nation, Jamaica has had a significant impact on music all around the world. Other than being the home of reggae, it is partially because of Jamaican immigrants that hip-hop exists. Jamaica is the birthplace of ska as well. Many Americans could probably name at least one famous Jamaican or person of Jamaican descent. As I stated above, the hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar did more to damage the country's reputation than improve it. The use of modern-day slave labor in preparing the country for the World Cup and the ultra-puritanical laws that visitors were subject to left a bad taste in the mouths of many foreigners. Qatar's much larger neighbor, Saudi Arabia, shares many similarities with the former.

Saudi Arabia's uphill battle to change its image

Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), Riyadh has tried to distance itself from its ties to radical Islam and present itself as a bastion of moderate Islam. In an Instagram post I made back in February, I made the argument that modern-day Saudi Arabia should not be considered a theocracy. Rather, Saudi Arabia should be labelled as an "Islamic absolute monarchy." A fitting (albeit imperfect) analogue would be the Holy Roman Empire. In both Saudi Arabia and the Holy Roman Empire, religion and politics were deeply intertwined. Both drew political legitimacy from religious authorities (the Wahhabi cleric and the Catholic Church, respectively). Religious officials also held major political sway. While there are differences between the two, I doubt that most historians would label the Holy Roman Empire as a theocracy. Regardless, I am sure this argument is still a hard sell for the casual observer. Riyadh faces an uphill battle in revamping its image.

Since the Saudi monarchy relies on religion for legitimacy and exercises custodianship of the two holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, Riyadh cannot completely jettison its ties to religion. The fact that 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudis and that Osama bin Laden was a Saudi also did not help Riyadh's PR. While Saudi Arabia has relaxed some of its conservative social policies and has taken steps to improve its relationship with non-Muslims, Riyadh cannot escape its reputation as a puritanical totalitarian state. Interestingly, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar adhere to the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). 

Out of the four Sunni fiqhs, the Hanbali school is the most conservative and has the most extreme interpretations of Islamic law. Until 2020, the Saudis would finance the building of mosques abroad that propagated Wahhabi thought and doctrine (in a manner acceptable to the Saudi monarchy). Although the plug was pulled on the construction of overseas mosques as part of the monarchy's larger foreign policy reorientation, Riyadh still retains significant cachet in the Islamic world. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation, founded in 1969 by King Faisal, is headquartered in Jeddah. The Islamic Development Bank, also founded with the support of King Faisal, is based in Jeddah as well. Through the IDB, Riyadh buys its way into currying favor with other majority-Muslim countries.

The announcement of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's ambitious Vision 2030 was a major turning point for Riyadh's foreign policy. According to Vision 2030's official website: "To achieve true happiness and fulfillment for all citizens and residents, we are prioritizing physical, psychological, and social wellbeing, which is why at the heart of our vision is creating a society where everyone enjoys a high quality of life, a healthy lifestyle, and an attractive living environment." Another goal of Vision 2030 is to increase foreign investment in Saudi Arabia. Creating an "attractive living environment" and increasing foreign direct investment, in my opinion, will prove difficult.

Allow me to share some statistics on Americans' views of the kingdom and how these relate to Saudi soft power and policy. According to a 2019 Gallup poll, only 4% of Americans had a "very favorable" view of Saudi Arabia, and 25% had a "somewhat favorable" view of the kingdom. Those numbers are lower than Venezuela's and Cuba's. Riyadh has been lavishing funds on infrastructure projects that have more visual value than actual practical function ("The Line" being one noteworthy example). The fact that these projects are constructed using the 21st-century equivalent of coolie labor creates just as much, if not more, negative press for the Saudis than any positive press that the project itself would generate. The Saudis are good at throwing money at their foreign policy objectives, but they are not good at attracting and persuading other countries and peoples toward their goals.

The UAE: Petrodollars spent right

Lastly, I would like to take some time to delve into the UAE's relationship with soft power. While the UAE is plagued by many of the same issues as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the UAE has been able to wield soft power more effectively than Riyadh and Doha. Firstly, the UAE has become less reliant upon oil revenues (though they still make up 30% of GDP) compared to the other two monarchies. In addition to this, the UAE is a hub for tourists around the world and is known for its business-friendly environment. Additionally, the UAE is known for its tough stance on Islamist terrorist groups and promotion of religious harmony. This cannot be said of Doha and Riyadh. Of course, Formula 1 and soccer fans alike have seen advertisements for Emirates, Etihad Airways, and Mubadala Investment Company. In the case of the UAE, they have been able to utilize soft power more effectively than the Saudis and Qataris due to the fact that there is a coherent long-term vision for the country beyond oil. The Al-Nahyan dynasty wants to not only diversify the country's economy but also become a global tech leader and a bastion of tolerance and social cohesion in the Gulf (among other goals). The Emiratis, relative to Riyadh and Doha, have done more than simply attempt to buy themselves positive press.

You might be wondering what soft power has to do with energy and security policy, so let me connect the dots. A country's soft power and its ability to portray itself and its policy priorities favorably in the international community are influential factors in international relations. A perfect case in point is the Israeli-Arab normalization process. The way Israel is viewed in the Arab street and the baggage associated with Israel have impeded normalization talks with other Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia. In the case of a liberal democracy, it is easier to sell a war or send foreign aid to help a country that most of your constituents have a positive opinion toward. Another case in point is America's security relationship with Israel. Over the last year and a half, Americans have become increasingly squeamish about weapons sales and military aid to Israel. American public opinion of Israel has also become more negative since October 7th. In contrast, most Americans view the NATO alliance favorably and favor America remaining a part of it. One of the reasons for this is that the countries that make up NATO are, on the whole, viewed positively by Americans. Countries like Germany, France, Italy, and the UK have their own forms of soft power. Americans are much more amenable to sending military and economic assistance to countries like the EU member states, Japan, or South Korea. 

Conclusion

The Gulf monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have been transformed by oil revenues. While these countries are taking steps to diversify their economies away from dependence on hydrocarbons, they are still relying on oil money as a proxy for actual diplomacy and developing proper soft power. A country, no matter how wealthy, cannot buy soft power. Also, military force cannot produce soft power. If a country is viewed overwhelmingly negatively as a 12th-century absolutist kingdom in 21st-century clothes, that will (especially in democratic societies) complicate doing business and cooperating on regional issues. The UAE and its ruling dynasty appear to have recognized this more than the Qatari and Saudi monarchies.

Further reading:

Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation by Neil Partrick (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/40dllv0)

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates: Foreign policy and strategic alliances in an uncertain world by Robert Mason (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/40hULAR)