Israel's "covert" ties with the GCC

In August 2020, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates agreed to normalize relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords. In December, Morocco followed suit. Interestingly enough, Jerusalem maintained covert relationships with Abu Dhabi and Manama before normalization. Morocco also kept covert contacts with Israel for decades before normalizing ties, even acting as an intermediary between Egypt and Israel as the two were discussing a peace deal. While Bahrain and the UAE are the only Gulf Cooperation Council member states that have established formal diplomatic ties with Jerusalem, they are far from the only states that cooperate with the Israelis behind closed doors. Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in particular have close informal relations with Jerusalem in the absence of official diplomacy.

Israel's and Oman's "secret" affair

Although Jerusalem and Muscat still have no formal relations, collaboration between the two countries has been ongoing for decades. This partnership dates back to the early 1970s when Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman faced a rebellion in the country's Dhofar region. The Sultan, who had overthrown his father in 1970, viewed the rebellion through an anti-communist lens and feared the intrusion of the Soviet Union and South Yemen into his country's affairs. The British, Iranians, and Israelis all assisted in crushing the rebellion in Dhofar to varying degrees. Israel likewise aided the royalists during North Yemen's civil war in the 1960s. The reason for Tel Aviv's intrusion into the affairs of the peninsula was driven by Israeli policymakers' interest in supporting conservative regimes that were more pro-Western in alignment against the more radical anti-Western Arab states like Egypt and Syria. From a Machiavellian perspective, the Israelis also wanted to drive a wedge within the Arab world.

Oman has been dubbed "the Switzerland of the Middle East" for its "friend to all, enemy to none" approach to diplomacy. Due to this approach, Muscat has adopted a moderate stance vis-a-vis Israel and Palestine. Oman supported the signing of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1978. Following the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, Oman was one of only three Arab states (one of the others being Morocco) not to have severed relations with Cairo. However, it is also because of this Switzerland-esque foreign policy that Muscat has not established formal ties with Jerusalem. Beginning in the 1980s, Sultan Qaboos would liaise with Mossad agents regularly. 

In the 1990s, after the conclusion of the Oslo Accords and the peace treaty with the Jordanians, secret meetings between Omani and Israeli government officials took place. On December 27th, 1994, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin met with Sultan Qaboos. This was the first public meeting between an Israeli head of state and a Gulf Arab leader. Another meeting between Israeli and Omani leaders took place in Washington in June 1995. After Rabin's assassination by a Jewish extremist in November, Omani officials were present at his funeral. In January of the following year, trade missions between Oman and Israel were opened. That April, Shimon Peres visited Oman and Qatar. Outside the realm of regional security, Oman is interested in a relationship with Israel due to the latter's world-leading desalination technology. Officials from the two countries met secretly under the umbrella of technological cooperation. In 2018, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Oman and met with Sultan Qaboos. 

Qatar: a closet friend or frenemy?

On the surface, it may seem that Qatar has an outright hostile disposition toward Israel. Indeed, Qatar  hosted Hamas leaders and sent millions in aid to Hamas. Antisemitic hate preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi was given refuge by the Qataris as well and even hosted his own program on the Qatari (partially) state-owned television network, Al Jazeera. Many Israelis see Qatar as a bedfellow with radical Islamic terrorist groups. As reprehensible as this may appear prima facie, this is only one dimension of Doha's foreign policy and must be contextualized. Qatar, being a tiny state with limited means of protecting itself, must cultivate amicable relationships with as many state and non-state actors as possible. This is why Doha will give succor to Hamas' senior officials while also allowing the United States to maintain the Al Udeid Air Base, the home of US Central Command. Qatar's policy of "hedging" (to use Mehran Kamrava's wording) has brought it into conflict with its GCC neighbors. Qatar, in deviation from most of the other GCC states, is closely linked to Tehran economically. Doha and Tehran both share the world's largest natural gas field. Iran and Qatar are among the world's top natural gas exporters. Qatar and Oman are the closest GCC states to Tehran diplomatically and economically. 

When examining both states' foreign policy, there are noticeable similarities between the approaches taken by Doha and Muscat. Like Oman, Qatar positions itself as a mediator within the broader region. The role Qatar played as a mediator during Lebanon's 2008 political crisis staved off a civil war. Additionally, Doha (until recently) engaged in mediation efforts in Gaza. As far as Israel is concerned, the Israelis operated an economic mission in Qatar as early as 1996. In April of that year, Israeli PM Shimon Peres visited Qatar. During the 2022 FIFA World Cup, the Qataris permitted Israeli tourists to attend the tournament. Military and intelligence officials from Israel have made visits to Qatar and both countries' chiefs of staff even met in Bahrain in March 2022 to discuss the threat posed by Iranian drones. The obstacle in the way of Qatari-Israeli normalization is the Palestinian issue. Doha viewed the signing of the 2020 Abraham Accords as tantamount to a betrayal of the Palestinians. Despite this, however, neither side is too inconvenienced by the current state of the relationship. 

The not-so-secret partnership between Riyadh and Jerusalem

Saudi-Israeli normalization has been a topic of deep discussion in recent years. More than a decade ago, the prospect of Saudi Arabia and Israel establishing ties was unthinkable. Between 2000 and 2004, Riyadh was Hamas' largest foreign donor. Before this, Israeli and Saudi foreign policy objectives had actually converged multiple times. During North Yemen's civil war in the 1960s, the two countries aided the royalists in their fight against Nasser's Egypt. Obviously, the security and geopolitical landscape has changed over the last few decades. One feature of this change is the covert partnership that has taken shape between Israel and Saudi Arabia. In contrast to Doha and Muscat, Riyadh views Iran as a major threat to its security. It is because of the shared threat posed by Tehran, as well as the fact that both are partners of America in the region, that the Israelis and the Saudis have been brought together at the table. 

This shift is visible within Saudi Arabia, as school textbooks have been revised to portray Jews and Israel more positively. In June 2022, Israel's then-foreign minister, Yair Lapid, stated that the Israelis sought peace with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh, meanwhile, expressed support for the Abraham Accords. It is likely that Israel's talks with Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and the UAE went on with the support and knowledge of Riyadh. The Saudis also allowed Israeli air traffic in their airspace. Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, said normalization would have "tremendous benefits" for both the kingdom and the broader region. Author Yoel Guzansky has described the evolving state of relations between Jerusalem and Riyadh as a "creeping normalization."

Israel and Saudi Arabia have maintained covert contacts in the realms of security, economics, and (more recently) interfaith dialogue between Muslims and Jews. The biggest obstacle to the establishment of official diplomatic relations is the solution (or lack thereof, rather) to the issue of Palestinian statehood. Another factor complicating the equation is the rejection of normalization with Israel by the Arab street. Jerusalem, meanwhile, has a vested interest in the kingdom's security and in the kingdom's warm relations with the United States. At present, formal ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia are viewed by the latter as a step too far. The Saudi leadership must walk the tightrope between positioning itself within America's security architecture (and closer to Israel) and catering to the values and opinions of the Arab street. If overt diplomatic connections were to take shape between the Israelis and Saudis, it is unlikely that these connections would be similar in form to those shaped by the Abraham Accords.

Israel's threat environment and the security environment of the Middle East in general have drawn Jerusalem closer to the Arab world, especially toward the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The connections Israel cultivates with those states have evolved under ever-dynamic circumstances. While numerous constraints have delayed de jure diplomacy between the Israelis and the remaining GCC members who have not normalized with them, there are tangible benefits to both covert and overt cooperation between these countries. Only time will tell if other Gulf Arab states will follow the lead of Manama and Abu Dhabi.