Israel's "covert" ties with the GCC

In August 2020, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates agreed to normalize relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords. In December, Morocco followed suit. Interestingly enough, Jerusalem maintained covert relationships with Abu Dhabi and Manama before normalization. Morocco also kept covert contacts with Israel for decades before normalizing ties, even acting as an intermediary between Egypt and Israel as the two were discussing a peace deal. While Bahrain and the UAE are the only Gulf Cooperation Council member states that have established formal diplomatic ties with Jerusalem, they are far from the only states that cooperate with the Israelis behind closed doors. Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia in particular have close informal relations with Jerusalem in the absence of official diplomacy.

Israel's and Oman's "secret" affair

Although Jerusalem and Muscat still have no formal relations, collaboration between the two countries has been ongoing for decades. This partnership dates back to the early 1970s when Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman faced a rebellion in the country's Dhofar region. The Sultan, who had overthrown his father in 1970, viewed the rebellion through an anti-communist lens and feared the intrusion of the Soviet Union and South Yemen into his country's affairs. The British, Iranians, and Israelis all assisted in crushing the rebellion in Dhofar to varying degrees. Israel likewise aided the royalists during North Yemen's civil war in the 1960s. The reason for Tel Aviv's intrusion into the affairs of the peninsula was driven by Israeli policymakers' interest in supporting conservative regimes that were more pro-Western in alignment against the more radical anti-Western Arab states like Egypt and Syria. From a Machiavellian perspective, the Israelis also wanted to drive a wedge within the Arab world.

Oman has been dubbed "the Switzerland of the Middle East" for its "friend to all, enemy to none" approach to diplomacy. Due to this approach, Muscat has adopted a moderate stance vis-a-vis Israel and Palestine. Oman supported the signing of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1978. Following the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, Oman was one of only three Arab states (one of the others being Morocco) not to have severed relations with Cairo. However, it is also because of this Switzerland-esque foreign policy that Muscat has not established formal ties with Jerusalem. Beginning in the 1980s, Sultan Qaboos would liaise with Mossad agents regularly. 

In the 1990s, after the conclusion of the Oslo Accords and the peace treaty with the Jordanians, secret meetings between Omani and Israeli government officials took place. On December 27th, 1994, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin met with Sultan Qaboos. This was the first public meeting between an Israeli head of state and a Gulf Arab leader. Another meeting between Israeli and Omani leaders took place in Washington in June 1995. After Rabin's assassination by a Jewish extremist in November, Omani officials were present at his funeral. In January of the following year, trade missions between Oman and Israel were opened. That April, Shimon Peres visited Oman and Qatar. Outside the realm of regional security, Oman is interested in a relationship with Israel due to the latter's world-leading desalination technology. Officials from the two countries met secretly under the umbrella of technological cooperation. In 2018, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Oman and met with Sultan Qaboos. 

Qatar: a closet friend or frenemy?

On the surface, it may seem that Qatar has an outright hostile disposition toward Israel. Indeed, Qatar  hosted Hamas leaders and sent millions in aid to Hamas. Antisemitic hate preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi was given refuge by the Qataris as well and even hosted his own program on the Qatari (partially) state-owned television network, Al Jazeera. Many Israelis see Qatar as a bedfellow with radical Islamic terrorist groups. As reprehensible as this may appear prima facie, this is only one dimension of Doha's foreign policy and must be contextualized. Qatar, being a tiny state with limited means of protecting itself, must cultivate amicable relationships with as many state and non-state actors as possible. This is why Doha will give succor to Hamas' senior officials while also allowing the United States to maintain the Al Udeid Air Base, the home of US Central Command. Qatar's policy of "hedging" (to use Mehran Kamrava's wording) has brought it into conflict with its GCC neighbors. Qatar, in deviation from most of the other GCC states, is closely linked to Tehran economically. Doha and Tehran both share the world's largest natural gas field. Iran and Qatar are among the world's top natural gas exporters. Qatar and Oman are the closest GCC states to Tehran diplomatically and economically. 

When examining both states' foreign policy, there are noticeable similarities between the approaches taken by Doha and Muscat. Like Oman, Qatar positions itself as a mediator within the broader region. The role Qatar played as a mediator during Lebanon's 2008 political crisis staved off a civil war. Additionally, Doha (until recently) engaged in mediation efforts in Gaza. As far as Israel is concerned, the Israelis operated an economic mission in Qatar as early as 1996. In April of that year, Israeli PM Shimon Peres visited Qatar. During the 2022 FIFA World Cup, the Qataris permitted Israeli tourists to attend the tournament. Military and intelligence officials from Israel have made visits to Qatar and both countries' chiefs of staff even met in Bahrain in March 2022 to discuss the threat posed by Iranian drones. The obstacle in the way of Qatari-Israeli normalization is the Palestinian issue. Doha viewed the signing of the 2020 Abraham Accords as tantamount to a betrayal of the Palestinians. Despite this, however, neither side is too inconvenienced by the current state of the relationship. 

The not-so-secret partnership between Riyadh and Jerusalem

Saudi-Israeli normalization has been a topic of deep discussion in recent years. More than a decade ago, the prospect of Saudi Arabia and Israel establishing ties was unthinkable. Between 2000 and 2004, Riyadh was Hamas' largest foreign donor. Before this, Israeli and Saudi foreign policy objectives had actually converged multiple times. During North Yemen's civil war in the 1960s, the two countries aided the royalists in their fight against Nasser's Egypt. Obviously, the security and geopolitical landscape has changed over the last few decades. One feature of this change is the covert partnership that has taken shape between Israel and Saudi Arabia. In contrast to Doha and Muscat, Riyadh views Iran as a major threat to its security. It is because of the shared threat posed by Tehran, as well as the fact that both are partners of America in the region, that the Israelis and the Saudis have been brought together at the table. 

This shift is visible within Saudi Arabia, as school textbooks have been revised to portray Jews and Israel more positively. In June 2022, Israel's then-foreign minister, Yair Lapid, stated that the Israelis sought peace with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh, meanwhile, expressed support for the Abraham Accords. It is likely that Israel's talks with Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and the UAE went on with the support and knowledge of Riyadh. The Saudis also allowed Israeli air traffic in their airspace. Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, said normalization would have "tremendous benefits" for both the kingdom and the broader region. Author Yoel Guzansky has described the evolving state of relations between Jerusalem and Riyadh as a "creeping normalization."

Israel and Saudi Arabia have maintained covert contacts in the realms of security, economics, and (more recently) interfaith dialogue between Muslims and Jews. The biggest obstacle to the establishment of official diplomatic relations is the solution (or lack thereof, rather) to the issue of Palestinian statehood. Another factor complicating the equation is the rejection of normalization with Israel by the Arab street. Jerusalem, meanwhile, has a vested interest in the kingdom's security and in the kingdom's warm relations with the United States. At present, formal ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia are viewed by the latter as a step too far. The Saudi leadership must walk the tightrope between positioning itself within America's security architecture (and closer to Israel) and catering to the values and opinions of the Arab street. If overt diplomatic connections were to take shape between the Israelis and Saudis, it is unlikely that these connections would be similar in form to those shaped by the Abraham Accords.

Israel's threat environment and the security environment of the Middle East in general have drawn Jerusalem closer to the Arab world, especially toward the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The connections Israel cultivates with those states have evolved under ever-dynamic circumstances. While numerous constraints have delayed de jure diplomacy between the Israelis and the remaining GCC members who have not normalized with them, there are tangible benefits to both covert and overt cooperation between these countries. Only time will tell if other Gulf Arab states will follow the lead of Manama and Abu Dhabi.

What is the UAE doing in Africa?

The United Arab Emirates, while minuscule in land area and population, is a military leviathan in the Arabian Peninsula and in Africa. The ruling Al Nahyan dynasty has prioritized investment in the country's defense apparatus, manifesting itself in the form of defense conglomerate EDGE Group and its status as the most militarily effective Arab state. In recent years, Abu Dhabi has enhanced its presence in Africa. Indeed, Emirati personnel participated in peacekeeping operations there under the auspices of the United Nations. However, Abu Dhabi is now advancing its own aims on the continent rather than operating under international bodies like the UN. Economic and security dimensions exist to the UAE's footprint on the continent. Why are the Emiratis investing more in Africa, and why are they constructing military bases there?

Abu Dhabi's military presence in Africa

The UAE's armed forces have operated on African soil for some time. Emirati military personnel took part in United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Emirati planes joined in the NATO-led air campaign against Libya in 2011. However, the UAE's presence on the African continent is far deeper than this. In March 2024, the Associated Press reported on an airstrip allegedly constructed by the Emiratis on the Socotra archipelago off the Horn of Africa. The airstrip was reportedly used for strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. Over the past decade, Abu Dhabi has built outposts in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and in North Africa. The Emiratis have not officially confirmed the existence of these outposts, though it is believed that these bases are maintained by the Emiratis in secret as a means of increasing their military reach without antagonizing local populations or tarnishing the country's global image.

In September 2015, the UAE built a military outpost in Eritrea to support its forces in Yemen. More specifically, the outpost served as a base to transport heavy weaponry and Sudanese personnel into Yemen. According to a February 2021 AP article, the Emiratis began dismantling the base as their security priorities began to shift. Eritrea, a small state in the Horn of Africa referred to as "Africa's North Korea," leased the base to the UAE for a period of 30 years. Neither Asmara nor Abu Dhabi responded to questions from AP journalists regarding the outpost. The UAE spent millions of dollars upgrading the facility at Assab, only 40 miles from Yemen. The Emiratis constructed a port and expanded the runway there in order to accommodate heavier aircraft.

This facility was previously built by the Italians, who were the dominant colonial power in the area. As time went on, the UAE stationed tanks, self-propelled howitzers, and amphibious fighting vehicles at this base. This installation also housed “one of the best field surgical hospitals anywhere in the Middle East” according to a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Attack helicopters, drones, and other aircraft have been spotted on the Assab complex's runways. While there has been dismantling of the base's facilities taking place, Emirati attack helicopters have still been seen using the airstrips there. The installation sits right off the Bab-el-Mandeb strait connecting the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea. Rebels in Ethiopia's Tigray region claimed that Emirati drones taking off from the Assab base had been used against their forces. The United Nations-supported government in Libya has accused the UAE of using Assab to transport weapons to Libya.

Since 2012, the UAE has furnished equipment, funding, and training to the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) via a base in Bosaso. They have also maintained bases in coastal towns like Qandala and Hafun. The PMPF was formed in 2011 to combat pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden. Abu Dhabi pays the PMPF's salaries. In January 2023, the UAE and Somalia inked an agreement to enhance security cooperation between the two countries. The Emiratis have provided training and funding to Mogadishu's security forces. Abu Dhabi has likewise trained security forces in Somaliland. The UAE built a military airfield in Somaliland as well, though it was later converted to a civilian airport. Additionally, the UAE is active in Ethiopia. The Emiratis are cooperating with Addis Ababa on the issue of terrorism. Ethiopia's Republican Guard, activated in 2018, is Emirati-trained.

It warrants mentioning that Abu Dhabi's presence is not limited solely to the Horn of Africa. In 2016, the UAE established a military academy in Mauritania. In 2018, the academy began training senior officers belonging to local armies. Abu Dhabi pledged tens of millions of dollars toward this military academy. In addition, the UAE has signed military cooperation agreements with countries like Senegal, Morocco, and Egypt. In 2023, Angola and the UAE concluded a deal in which the latter would supply corvettes to Angola's navy. The Emiratis also agreed to provide military equipment to Kenya, Uganda, and the DRC.

The Emirati economic presence in Africa

Abu Dhabi's footprint on the African continent is not limited to the security sphere. In recent years, the Emiratis have purchased land in sub-Saharan Africa. The reason for this is simple: the UAE's geography. The UAE has no rivers and only a tiny fraction of its landmass is suitable for agriculture. An Emirati-based company called Blue Carbon LLC (owned by a member of the ruling family) has recently acquired land in Tanzania, Liberia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to convert portions of their land into carbon credits. Blue Carbon's carbon offsetting deals cover a fifth of Zimbabwe's land, 10% of Liberia's and Zambia's land, and 8% of Tanzania's. Collectively, this amounts to an area approximately the size of the United Kingdom. It is reported that even more land deals are to come.

It should be mentioned that Blue Carbon's chairman, Sheikh Ahmed Dalmook al-Maktoum, has no prior experience in nature conservation. Prior to this, the sheik was involved in selling the Russian Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccine. According to Christopher Davidson, a scholar at Durham University, "it was unlikely that al-Maktoum was operating without the approval of the UAE government in his business dealings." Blue Carbon and the sheik himself have come under scrutiny with regard to their business dealings. The sheik organized sales of the Sputnik V vaccine to Ghana, Guyana, Lebanon, and Pakistan in 2021. Deliveries of these vaccines did not always go as planned as they sometimes failed to arrive and the cost of the vaccines sparked outrage. The issue of the vaccines proved so outrageous that calls had been made for Ghana's health minister to resign. One of the two advisers for Blue Carbon LLC, Samuele Landi, is a convicted criminal in Italy. Landi was twice convicted of fraudulent bankruptcy and lives as a fugitive in the UAE. Samuele Landi was also the founder and CEO of Eutelia, one of Italy's largest telecom companies.

Over the last decade, the UAE has invested nearly $60 billion dollars in Africa. The second-largest GCC investor, Saudi Arabia, invested $25.6 billion. In March 2024, an Emirati company purchased a majority stake in one of Zambia's copper mines. During the past decade, the volume of trade between the UAE and sub-Saharan Africa increased by more than 30%. Another Emirati firm, DP World (a logistics company), is investing $80 million into a logistics park over 300,000 square meters in size as part of a deal with Egypt's Suez Canal Economic Zone. This firm also inked a 30-year contract to upgrade and operate a portion of Dar es Salaam's port in Tanzania. In February 2024, Kenya and the Emirates signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. The CEPA aims to bolster trade, investment, and economic cooperation between Nairobi and Abu Dhabi. On July 22, 2024, Mauritius and the UAE signed a CEPA in Dubai.

In June 2023, several major companies with links to the Emirates joined together to form the UAE Carbon Alliance with the aim of developing a unified national carbon market. The Carbon Alliance pledged in September 2023 that it would purchase over $400 million in African carbon credit by the year 2030. According to a December 2023 article in Le Monde, "This interest comes as no surprise. The world's 7th-largest oil producer has no intention of abandoning fossil fuel extraction, even though this has been identified as the main cause of global warming, but it will not remain on the sidelines of climate negotiations either." A visible demonstration of this commitment to combating climate change was the selection of Dubai as the host city for the 2023 COP28 Conference. However, as stated previously, since revenues from hydrocarbons still make up such a large portion of the Emirati economy, Emirati commitment to fighting climate change has its obvious limits.

The United Arab Emirates, along with the other GCC states, has increased its military and economic footprint in Africa. Trade between the GCC and sub-Saharan Africa has grown significantly and is worth keeping an eye on in the coming years. The volatile security situation in the waters off the Arabian Peninsula has given the Emiratis an impetus to invest in Africa's security and the constraints imposed on the UAE by its geography have stimulated economic investment on the continent. Some analysts have talked of a new "scramble for Africa" and it will be interesting to see how the continent's military and economic landscape transforms over the following years.