Why are Iran and Saudi Arabia rivals?

Hello, everyone! This weekend, I want to share my latest video with you all. I chronicle and analyze the complex and often adversarial relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Be sure to like my video, share my video, and sound off in the comments section!

How Africa could be Israel's next strategic partner

Israel's relations with sub-Saharan Africa are not often talked about in the news, but they have a deep practical and ideological basis. In his 1902 fiction work, Altneuland, Theodor Herzl (the father of political Zionism) wrote of "assisting in the redemption of the Africans." The father of pan-Africanism, Edward Wilmot Blyden, used Zionism as an ideological framework. Of course, there are the ties between the Jews and Africa that go back to antiquity, when the Queen of Sheba visited King Solomon. As the Europeans departed from Africa throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Israel established working relationships with the newly independent African states. The Israelis sent agricultural experts and exported agricultural technology to countries like Zambia. Israel's ties to Africa are even more important today, as Africa has experienced significant demographic and economic growth in recent years. There are lucrative and greatly beneficial opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa that Israel could capitalize on, thereby bolstering its security and economy. Allow me to propose policies that Jerusalem can pursue to forge deeper ties with Africa and use those ties to Israel's advantage.

Why does Africa matter to Israel?

Africa matters to Israel for the same reasons it matters to every other major player on the continent: its strategic location, mineral wealth, and untapped markets for goods and services. Compared to the US, China, and even the UAE, Israel's presence in Africa is minimal. I will give you some figures to put this in perspective. In 2023, the UAE exported $2.86 billion of products to Kenya (one of the economic powerhouses of Africa), while the reverse was $716 million. Israeli exports to Kenya, meanwhile, amounted to $41 million, and Kenyan exports to Israel totaled roughly $16 million. Emirati exports to Nigeria totaled just north of $1 billion. Nigeria's exports to the UAE amounted to a slightly higher number ($1.3 billion). Israeli trade with Nigeria is negligible by comparison. In 2023, Israel exported $25 million worth of products to Nigeria, while Israel imported $558 million of Nigerian products. Emirati-South African trade in 2023 totaled over $4 billion in both directions. Israeli-South African trade, for comparison, came out to $230 million in both directions. And even the UAE's (the biggest GCC investor in Africa) investments are dwarfed by China's investments. China exported approximately $30 billion in products to South Africa, $18 billion to Nigeria, and $4.6 billion to Kenya. Needless to say, Israel is on the back foot on a continent that provides massive potential.

Jerusalem could benefit economically from increased engagement with Africa through easier access to African mineral resources and African markets. In the international arena, Israel could court certain actors on the continent and rely upon them for diplomatic protection at the UN. Within the realm of defense and security, there is an untapped market for Israeli weapons. In addition, Africa's strategic geography and proximity to Israel could give it an impetus to further its involvement on the continent. Israel is perfectly positioned to meet the economic and security needs of African states through its world-leading agri-tech industry and its cachet within the global arms market. The Israeli tech industry and Israel's start-up culture can foster innovation and growth in an Africa that is moving into the 21st century.

Angola: Untapped energy and markets

Angola is one of sub-Saharan Africa's biggest oil exporters. Israel, meanwhile, is a net importer of oil. Israel receives most of its oil from four countries: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Gabon, and Brazil. Other countries, like Nigeria and the Republic of the Congo, also export oil to Israel. One of the biggest challenges facing the Angolan oil sector is a lack of proper technology and facilities for extracting and refining oil. In fact, Angola has been unable to sustain higher rates of oil production due to the dearth of modern equipment and facilities. This presents an excellent opportunity for Israel to increase its involvement on the African continent. Israel could upgrade Angola's oil production facilities in exchange for a portion of Angola's oil exports. This is not without historical precedent. In the late 1940s, Israel agreed to send oil drills, oil pipes, and agricultural experts to Romania in exchange for exit visas for tens of thousands of Romanian Jews. Not only could Israel revamp the Angolan oil facilities, but it could also engage in other infrastructure projects in the country. Israel has a long history of sending teams of agricultural and other experts to work in African countries. Angola is a majority-Christian country and no longer part of OPEC, therefore free of two potential sources of pressure. 

Nigeria: A potential security and energy partner

Abuja has the potential to develop a closer business relationship with Jerusalem. Most Christian Nigerians also have Zionist sympathies, facilitating ties between the two. In fact, the two already have some semblance of a security relationship, but there is room for this relationship to evolve. Israel has provided training to Nigerian special operations forces and has inked arms deals with Nigeria in the past. Abuja is actually the largest African importer of Israeli weaponry. In 2006, Nigeria and Israel signed a deal in which the Israelis would provide the Nigerians with air, land, and sea-based surveillance systems. Israel was once poised to sell helicopters to Nigeria, but the United States intervened to stop the deal. Regardless, in April 2025, the Nigerian government reaffirmed its commitment to cooperating with Israel on matters of defense and intelligence. 

Israeli weapons platforms have the added benefit of being "battle-tested." In addition, Israel has the most developed arms industry in the Middle East and North Africa. Israel also has expertise in counterinsurgency conducted against radical Islamists, similar to the war the Nigerian government is fighting against Boko Haram. It is worth mentioning that Turkey is another source of arms for Nigeria. However, Israeli weaponry carries greater cachet than its Turkish counterparts, and the potential exists for Israel to muscle Turkey out of the regional arms market. Jerusalem can export greater quantities of newer and more effective surveillance systems to the Nigerians, along with counterinsurgency training. Again, this has historical precedent. Throughout the Cold War, retired or reservist IDF officers would train and arm proxy forces and states in the Middle East and Africa. Jerusalem can also export its world-leading agri-tech to Nigeria. Israel gains another friend at the UN and another oil source, and Nigeria gets assistance in improving its security situation along with increased foreign investment. 

Rwanda, Senegal, and Kenya: possible pillars of Israeli Africa policy

Post-genocide Rwanda has emerged as one of Israel's most strident allies on the African continent. Paul Kagame, in particular, has a positive view of Israel. In Kagame's eyes, Israel could serve as a possible partner in checking the influence of Islamic fundamentalism in Africa. Another element of Paul Kagame's foreign policy is his pro-American orientation. Fostering good relations with Israel was part of fostering good relations with Washington. Kigali also sees in Israel an example worthy of emulating, especially its startup culture and its high-tech sector. The Israelis have also exported agri-tech to Rwanda. Unsurprisingly, Jerusalem has exported arms to Kigali, too. Compared to its neighbors, Rwanda is stable and prosperous; thus, there is reason to believe that the Rwandan-Israeli partnership will endure. Current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has incorporated Rwanda into his greater strategy of renewing Israeli ties with Africa. 

Senegal is another potential partner of Israel's in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite being a majority-Muslim country, Dakar maintained warm relations with the Israelis. Senegal already has strong security ties to France and the United States, the Senegalese military having been trained and armed by Paris and Washington. In addition to this, the Senegalese military has a reputation within the region for its professionalism and discipline. Add to this the fact that the armed forces are apolitical and have never been involved in any coups, which makes it an outlier in West Africa. Senegal has even contributed troops to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, making it the only non-Arab state in the coalition. This also gave Senegalese personnel experience operating in the Middle East. Israeli-Senegalese security ties could deepen in the future. Jerusalem could furnish drones and other surveillance equipment. Israel could even provide lethal equipment since Dakar is not currently involved in any ongoing major conflicts in which human rights abuses could present problems. IDF personnel could also cooperate more closely with their Senegalese counterparts, and train them in counterinsurgency tactics acquired through years of real-world experience. The Senegalese, for their part, would gain a new security partner and another source of arms if relations change between Dakar and its patrons (which is a valid concern in the case of Washington, given the mercurial nature of the current administration). Senegal's economy is growing quickly, and the country is comparatively stable and successful. 

Kenya is an economic powerhouse in East Africa and sub-Saharan Africa in general. Additionally, Kenya has close ties with the United States and even with Israel. During the Entebbe raid in July 1976, Nairobi allowed IDF aircraft access to Kenyan airspace en route to and from Uganda. About half of Kenyan adults have a favorable view of Israel, which is a higher number than in some European countries. Just like Nigeria, Kenya is dealing with its own radical Islamic insurgency in the form of Al-Shabaab. Israel can likewise provide counterinsurgency training, share intelligence, and provide non-lethal military equipment. Like Israel and Rwanda, Kenya has a vibrant startup culture. In fact, the government is promoting the growth of startups by offering tax incentives and easier access to credit. Kenya, like Rwanda, wants to emulate the success of the Israeli startup ecosystem. This is another area where Israel can outshine its competitors. Rwanda, Senegal, and Kenya can serve as economic gateways for Israeli goods to the broader African market and as investment hubs. These three countries can also give Jerusalem diplomatic support at the United Nations. Resting Israeli policy upon the pillars of Nairobi, Kigali, and Dakar is tantamount to betting on a group of winners.

I'd like to take some time to discuss one last country: Eritrea. As reprehensible as the current government in Asmara may be, Eritrea is strategically important for Israel. Access to the Red Sea is an economic lifeline for Israel, and establishing a greater military presence there will become more crucial in the future. Establishing a base in Djibouti is out of the question, as Djibouti is an Arab League member and has no relations with Israel. For other political reasons, establishing a base in Sudan is also not a possibility. Jerusalem's options are either Somaliland or Eritrea. Jerusalem's ties with Asmara before 2020 were close. Israel has also been accused of, at best, protecting, and, at worst, aiding and abetting Eritrean government agents targeting Eritrean asylum seekers within Israel. The Israelis have had an ongoing problem with undocumented migrants from Eritrea and Sudan. It is Israel's support for the Eritrean regime that has fomented tensions (and even violent clashes) within Eritrean communities in Israel. It has been alleged that Israel has submarines operating in Eritrean waters. Indeed, Israel has two primary security issues in the Red Sea: the Houthis and the undocumented migrants from Sudan and Eritrea. Increasing its military footprint in the Red Sea would enable Israel to handle these security concerns more effectively. A permanent troop presence in Eritrea would not be feasible. An Israeli military presence in Eritrea would have to take shape through limited naval access agreements. 

How would Israel benefit from this strategy?

Fostering deeper cooperation with states in sub-Saharan Africa has a multitude of benefits for Jerusalem. Israel stands to gain diplomatically, economically, and geopolitically. Deepening cooperation with African states (especially powerhouses like Kenya and Nigeria) could win it more friends in the African Union and the United Nations. This would insulate Israel from the impact of Arab countries' and other anti-Israel states' votes at the UN. Israeli businesses would have greater access to African markets, as well as other potential sources of energy, if any of Israel's oil suppliers decide to cut off the flow of petroleum. Most importantly, Israel would gain much-needed soft power in a strategically vital area of the world. Israel's agricultural technology and its high-tech industry distinguish it from other players on the continent, like Iran and Turkey. On top of this, Jerusalem can serve as a supplier of proven, high-quality military equipment without being as constrained by the same human rights concerns that Washington and Western European capitals face. 

What challenges does Israel face in Africa?

Of course, any major policy decision is going to face roadblocks. In this case, the most obvious roadblock to increased Israeli engagement in Africa is the volatile security situation on the continent. As stated before, Israel can devote more resources and effort toward improving ties with more stable and prosperous African countries. Another obvious roadblock is the high level of corruption that pervades many African governments. To mitigate the risk of economic mismanagement, Israel could work through multilateral entities such as the African Development Bank or West Africa's EBID to distribute economic and other forms of aid. One other challenge that Jerusalem must contend with is the sheer number of players active in Africa. The United States, China, France, Iran, Turkey, and the UAE are also taking part in this 21st-century Scramble for Africa. Israel can cash in on its reputation as a powerhouse in agricultural technology and water technology, as well as its reputation as a global high-tech hub. These are all technologies that African states are in dire need of, and Israel can deliver. Lastly, Jerusalem has to navigate through human rights and reputational concerns (which is nothing new for Israel) associated with cooperating with regimes that have poor human rights records (like Kagame's Rwanda). This can best be done by signing transparent agreements with African states and enabling them to develop their own arms industries. In fact, Nigeria is already developing an indigenous weapons industry. The challenges presented can be surmounted, and this strategy can yield major dividends for Jerusalem.

Conclusion

Israel is underutilizing its potential in Africa. If Jerusalem devotes more energy and resources toward courting Africa, it will improve the country's political, economic, and security outlook. This will not be a one-sided relationship reminiscent of the European colonialism of old, in which only the foreigners will benefit. There are significant bonuses for the Africans, too. African states can get increased investment and more access to technology on par with the West's without the lectures on human rights and democracy that come with Western assistance. Israel should act now to secure a substantial long-term presence in Africa's economic, diplomatic, and security landscape. Do you agree or disagree with this strategy for Jerusalem? Let me know in the comments below!

Further reading:

1: Routledge Handbook on Israel's Foreign Relations by Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfold (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/4lgYDJT)

2: The Star and the Scepter: A Diplomatic History of Israel by Emmanuel Navon (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/3UmHELi)

Who are the Middle East's biggest arms exporters?

Many Middle Eastern countries, especially the Arab countries in the Gulf, spend billions upon billions on defense and defense-related procurement. The United States and other NATO member states have a massive footprint in the Middle Eastern arms market. However, what must be addressed in greater detail is the growing presence that Middle Eastern countries have within the global arms market. Countries like Israel and the UAE have invested heavily in developing indigenous arms industries and even export weapons to countries outside of the Middle East. There are other major players in the Middle Eastern arms market, like Turkey and Iran. In this post, I will answer the following questions: How did the arms industries of these countries develop? What is the outlook for these countries' arms exports going forward?

Israel: King of the hill

To the surprise of absolutely no one, Israel is the biggest weapons exporter in the Middle East. In fact, Israel ranks 8th in global arms exports. As of 2024, Europe was the Israeli arms industry's biggest market. Prior to this, India was Israel's number one customer. The ongoing war in Ukraine stimulated defense spending and production across Europe, and this proved to be a boon for the Israeli defense industry as well. The history of the Israeli arms industry actually dates back to the early 20th century, before the state of Israel was even established. In Mandatory Palestine, the Yishuv maintained underground weapons factories hidden from the British authorities. Due to the educational and wealth gap between the average Jew and the average Arab at the time, the Jews were able to maintain an indigenous arms production capability (however primitive it may have been). As a result of this educational and economic gulf, the Yishuv had a technological edge over its Arab adversaries.

Another factor that gave Israel an impetus to produce weapons locally was the precariousness of its arms supply from outside. For the first two decades of its existence, Israel's patron was France. The French provided weaponry like AMX-30 tanks and Mirage fighter jets to the Israelis, but relations between Paris and Tel Aviv had cooled after the French withdrawal from Algeria and the Six-Day War. The French even held missile boats that were due to be exported to Israel due to an embargo (which the Israelis ended up stealing from their port using special operations commandos). Prominent Israeli weapons include the iconic Uzi submachine gun and the Iron Dome air defense system. It is the latter that has generated major interest in foreign markets in recent years. Countries like the US, UK, Canada, and Finland have purchased either complete Iron Dome systems or portions of Iron Dome technology. 

Israel has sold weapons to countries like the Philippines and Azerbaijan, too. The Israelis were once on the cusp of selling early-warning radar systems to China before the US pressurized Israel into canceling the deal. Israeli firm Elbit Systems (producer of the famed Merkava tank) is one of the world's top-30 defense contractors according to SIPRI. Other noteworthy Israeli defense contractors in the top 100 include Israel Aerospace Industries and Rafael. The revenues of these defense firms have been trending upward. In 2024, annual Israeli arms sales reached a new record. According to figures from Israel's defense ministry, weapons sales in 2024 amounted to more than twice the value of weapons sales five years earlier. Interestingly, Arab countries like the UAE, Morocco, and Bahrain accounted for 12% of Israeli weapons exports. Although some European countries have either canceled procurement deals with Israel or sanctioned Israeli defense firms over Gaza, arms sales have continued to increase. 

The UAE: Arabia's "Little Sparta"

The military of the United Arab Emirates is an anomaly in the Arab world in terms of combat capability and professionalism. In fact, the ruling al-Nahyan dynasty has invested large sums of money and resources into improving the capabilities of the UAE's armed forces and pursuing a more assertive security policy. One component of this is the Emirati defense conglomerate, EDGE. EDGE began as the Emirates Defense Industries Company in 2014. EDGE produces armored land vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and electronic warfare systems (just to name a few products). Another prominent Emirati weapons export is the Caracal pistol. Caracal pistols are in service with countries like Jordan and Bahrain. 

The Emiratis have also exported military hardware to countries like Indonesia. In fact, the UAE is the world's 21st-largest weapons exporter. Emirati defense contractors have worked with prominent American firms like Raytheon and Russian defense firms like VR-Technologies. Despite the presence of an emerging indigenous arms industry, the Emiratis are still heavily dependent upon American and European weapons systems. However, there is hope for the prospects of the UAE's military-industrial complex, as EDGE Group has worked with emerging countries like India and Brazil in co-producing weapons systems. The UAE has signed several arms deals and military cooperation agreements in recent years, indicating that there could be further business opportunities for Emirati defense contractors.   

Turkey: Another regional powerhouse

Turkey is second to Israel in terms of regional arms exports. Like Israel, Turkey built its own defense industry to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers. Recently, Turkish defense contractors have been encountering success in European markets. In late 2024, Turkish firm STM signed an agreement with the Portuguese Navy to build fleet replenishment vessels. This agreement marked Turkey's first sale of a naval vessel to an EU or NATO member state. The majority of Turkish arms exports have gone to countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, like North Macedonia and Ukraine. In 2018, Qatar inked a deal to purchase Bayraktar TB2 drones from Ankara. 

In 2024, Turkey inked a deal with Spain to collaborate in the production of jet trainer aircraft. Turkish drone maker Baykar acquired Italian firm Piaggio Aerospace in June 2025. The transformation of the European security environment after February 2022 has been a boon for Ankara as well. The Turkish also have the advantage of being integrated within the greater European security architecture, while also being far enough away from Europe geographically and politically to have the autonomy to cultivate working relationships with states like Russia and non-EU European states like Albania and North Macedonia. 

Iran: Pariah state aiding other pariahs

Iran's defense sector is hampered by political isolation and strategic dependence on Russia and China (especially the former). The country's armed forces still largely use legacy American equipment, the spare parts for which are extremely difficult to come by. Due to its dependence on Russia and Russia's need for as much military hardware as it can throw at Ukraine, Iran has exported systems like drones (most notably, the Shahed-136) to the Russians. I must mention, however, that the Russians are producing a locally-made variant of the Shahed-136 (known as the Geran-2) in large quantities. The Russians are also able to acquire spare parts for these systems from China rather than Iran. 

The Iranians have been doing their own reverse engineering with Chinese-made platforms (either acquired legally before the strengthening of sanctions or through intermediaries or third countries). Iran has leaned on the strategy of reverse engineering weapons systems rather than creating indigenous platforms from scratch due to cost constraints and Tehran's political and economic isolation. During the confrontations with Israel in 2024 and 2025, Iran's stockpile of medium-range missiles and the cachet of Iranian and Russian weaponry sustained heavy blows. Iran is becoming a less important partner for Russia and China, though the Iranians still need Moscow and Beijing. Iranian arms exports are reported to trend downward in the future, due to declining demand from Russia and Israeli strikes on Iranian military infrastructure.

Conclusion

Four countries dominate the Middle Eastern arms market: Israel, Iran, Turkey, and the UAE. Except for the UAE, these countries have had to build their own arms industries out of necessity. These states have managed not only to supply their own militaries with indigenous weapons, but also to export military hardware to countries as far afield as Europe and North America. The global arms market is witnessing the rise of exporters from the Middle East at the expense of Russia and other established arms suppliers. With countries looking to wean themselves off Russian/Soviet weapons platforms, the arms exporters of the Middle East are well-positioned to take on a more substantial share of the world arms market.

Further Reading

1: Armies of Arabia by Zoltan Barany (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/3IZNwry)

2: Routledge Handbook on Israel's Foreign Relations by Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfold (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/3IRHqcH)

3: The Star and the Scepter by Emmanuel Navon (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/3HjzjoF)

4: The Sword and the Olive by Martin van Creveld (PURCHASE IT HERE: https://amzn.to/4oBp9kj)